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Abstract 
 
This research’s objective was to apply the Bass Diffusion model to border security and 
illegal immigration.   The Potential Actual Illegal Immigration Population (PAIIP) model 
was created using the Vensim software program to illustrate and simulate illegal border 
crossings and assess the impact of detention, deportation, and amnesty on the 
communication between potential and actual illegal immigrants.  This systems modeling 
approach combined with a secondary analysis method was used for data collection and 
analysis.  Results indicate that no single or combination of policies solves the problem of 
illegal immigration.  This study’s conclusions point out that the greater the quality of 
information communicated between actual illegal immigrants that reside in the United 
States and potential illegal immigrants that live outside of the United States increases the 
probability of illegal crossings.  Policymakers should ensure that institutions and agencies 
work in unison at the local, state, and federal level to deter illegal immigration and 
provide national security. 
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I. Introduction 
Using a systems modeling approach and the Vensim software program, the 
Potential Actual Illegal Immigration Population (PAIIP) model was created to 
theoretically illustrate and simulate illegal border crossings.  The PAIIP model 
hypothesizes that the content of communication, or border crossivity, between actual and 
potential illegal immigrants stimulates illegal crossings.  This study uses the PAIIP model 
to illustrate the effectiveness of detention, deportation, and amnesty on the ability to 
deter illegal immigration and terrorism.  This research study also compares the amount of 
border security spending with the apprehension of illegal immigrants.  The results from 
this study reveal that policies involving border protection and illegal immigration must 
work in unison on a local, state, and federal level in order to prevent violation of 
immigration law.  Policies should explore the motivation and factors surrounding illegal 
immigration to ensure a safe United States and encourage legal entry. 
I.1 What is the problem? 
At least 10 million illegal immigrants reside in the United States of America 
(Hanson, 2007).  Many of these are undocumented immigrants who overstay their visas.  
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) did a study and estimated the visa overstay 
population in the United States to be at least 3.6 million out of an estimated 9 to 10 
million illegal immigrants (Lipton, 2005).  In 2004, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) received 301,046 leads on possible visa violators, but out of the 4,164 
who were formally investigated, there were only 671 apprehensions (Lipton, 2005).  With 
a large proportion of illegal immigrants overstaying their visas, the techniques used 
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towards their apprehension, as well as the prevention of this type of abuse, raises serious 
questions about the allocation of resources towards border patrol funding.     
  There are daily attempts to cross the northern and southern border of the United 
States by thousands of illegal aliens from Mexico, Canada, and countries all across the 
globe.  After the tragic events of September 11, 2001, there is a fear that terrorists may 
sneak into the United States using the same smuggling networks as illegal immigrants 
from Mexico or Canada.  In 2002 alone, a half million illegal immigrants entered the 
United States (Hanson, 2007, p. 25).  Although the number of entrants into the United 
States does not add to the net growth rate of the illegal immigrant population since many 
of them return home each year, such behavior and potential annual growth in the visa 
overstay population and illegal alien population pose a major problem for the citizens and 
government of the United States.   
The responsibility of maintaining border security and reducing illegal 
immigration is a huge financial endeavor that requires funding from the government.  The 
three key public policy strategies that the United States government has used to tackle 
border security and illegal immigration are detention, deportation, and amnesty.  The last 
time amnesty was granted to illegal immigrants living in the United States was under 
President Ronald Reagan’s administration through the Immigration Reform and Control 
Act (IRCA) of 1986.   Today there is a debate over whether or not amnesty should once 
again be granted to illegal immigrants.  Other policy strategies which work 
simultaneously are surveillance on the border, e-verification, workplace raids, 
prosecution of employers who hire undocumented workers, and increased fencing.    
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With the election of President Barack Obama in 2008, a new administration has 
entered the White House with its own policy agenda and philosophy towards immigration 
reform.  President Obama’s administration also incorporates the public policy strategies 
of immigration raids, electronic technologies such as E-Verify, and an increase in border 
surveillance to combat illegal border crossings.  As a Senator for Illinois in 2005, 
President Obama voted for the Secure Fence Act; the work on its construction is 
continuing (Reese, 2009). 
Unlike President George W. Bush, President Obama’s administration is 
exercising more patience and caution with immigration raids and has placed several 
delays on them by performing more analysis prior to raiding a worksite (Hsu, 2009).  As 
a result, ICE is shifting its focus from detaining illegal workers to prosecuting employers 
who hire them and encouraging the use of E-Verify as a policy alternative (Hsu, 2009).  
Run by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Social Security 
Administration (SSA), E-Verify is a voluntary program that enables participating 
employers to verify the residency and employment eligibility status of their potential 
employees. 
I.2 Why are Border Security and Illegal Immigration Public Policy Issues? 
Any person who is not a citizen or national of the United States is an alien 
(Immigration and Nationality Act, 2009).  An illegal immigrant is a person who enters 
the United States without official approval.  Border security and illegal immigration are 
public policy issues because they impact the lives of Americans and the United States 
politically, economically, and socially.  These three elements are not isolated; they are 
intertwined, because a policy remedy on one issue affects the other.   
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Many of the decision makers and stakeholders in politics and immigration reform 
are public policy officials throughout the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of 
the government.  The policies implemented and enforced by these various branches 
provide national security to the United States.   Legislation such as the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 directly and indirectly 
affects citizens and immigrants who reside in America legally or unlawfully.  The 
ratification of this act increased the attention placed on deterrence, stronger fencing was 
constructed in San Diego; the latest military technology was integrated for security; 
punishment for smugglers, migrants without documentation, and people who overstayed 
their visas became stricter; and finally, 1,000 new Border Patrol agent jobs were created 
(Massey, 2005).   
Enforcing immigration law and securing the borders of the United States cost 
billions of dollars.  Immigrants who cross the border illegally or overstay their visas find 
employment and utilize some of the resources the United States economic system offers 
such as education and healthcare.  The economic relationship between America and 
Mexico is also a factor in immigration policy making.  Between 1986 and 2002, the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service’s (INS) budget increased from $474 million to 
$6.2 billion, and over the same time period the Border Patrol’s budget increased from 
$151 million to $1.6 billion (Massey, 2005).  As the number of Mexicans who entered the 
United States with business visas increased from 128,000 a year in 1986, to 438,000 a 
year in 2003, the total trade in goods and services between both nations increased over 
the same time period to approximately $235 billion (Massey, 2005).  Based on these 
examples, border security and illegal immigration are economic public policy issues that 
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the government must address as they distribute funds to deter and prevent more growth in 
the number of undocumented immigrants.       
Socially, most immigrants live in families with a blend of legal statuses, 
opportunities, and dreams (Gonzalez, 2009).  In the event a family member faces 
detention and deportation, the likelihood of long-term or permanent separation makes 
policy making arduous, especially when there are children involved.  Sometimes a child 
may be a natural born citizen of the United States, and either one or both of their family 
members are undocumented; such scenarios make policy solutions for border security 
and illegal immigration complex.  
I.3 Why are Border Security and Illegal Immigration a Science and 
Technology Issue? 
Border Security requires the latest scientific and technological innovations to 
capture potential illegal immigrants.  The use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and 
Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs) to deter illegal immigration and prevent terrorism is 
supported by Congress.  UAVs and RPVs increase the number of hours and the distance 
border patrol can be enforced and can, therefore, improve the apprehension rate of illegal 
crossers (Blazakis, 2004, p. 3).  Although new technology can increase border patrol 
efficiency, such advancements are costly.  In 2008, President George W. Bush asked for 
$13 billion to enhance border security and immigration enforcement; $1 billion from this 
amount was proposed for fence construction and safety measures along Mexico’s border 
(Hanson, 2007, p. 24).    
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Scientific and technological evaluation and risk assessment help to increase the 
probability that technologies used are reliable and safe.  Innovative technologies, such as 
improved biometric data recognition and storage, UAVs, RPVs, and identification cards 
with radio frequency identification chips, imply that public policy officials must be 
cautious about the political, economic, and social ramifications of using scientific and 
technological tools to secure the borders of the United States.  
I.4. Roadmap 
The next section is a literature review which provides a background on border 
security and illegal immigration issues and policies such as chain migration, detention, 
deportation, and amnesty.  After that is a section that presents the major research 
questions this study will attempt to answer.  Next, there is a methodology section which 
summarizes the analytical processes and tools that were used in this study.  Moreover, the 
methods section provides an explanation of the PAIIP model.  Following that are the 
results from running the PAIIP model, as well as other quantitative border security and 
immigration data.  Finally, the remaining chapters of this research study are the 
Discussion, Policy Recommendations, and Conclusion sections, which respectively 
highlight the key strengths and limits of this study. 
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II. Literature Review 
The PAIIP model was designed using systems modeling to simulate illegal border 
penetration by potential illegal immigrants.  First, the literature review will outline the 
current United States strategy towards providing border security and deterring illegal 
immigration.  Next, it will present some of the motivations, consequences, and factors 
behind illicit border crossing.  Because the PAIIP model provides a means towards policy 
analysis on detention and deportation and amnesty, the strengths and weaknesses of each 
of these policies will be discussed.  Finally, border security spending will be compared to 
illegal alien apprehensions using a linear regression approach.  Therefore, the qualitative 
and quantitative evidence presented in this literature review will provide the theory 
behind the PAIIP model’s design.       
II.1 Border Security Strategy of the United States 
The present border security strategy of the United States encompasses the 
combination of the Obama administration’s agenda as well as that of Immigration & 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP).  President 
Obama has a five-point agenda for providing border security.   
First, the Obama administration intends to provide additional support for the 
employees, systems, and technological resources along the borders and ports of entry of 
the United States.  Second, Obama’s administration would like to augment the number of 
legal immigrants to ensure that families stay together and, at the same time, fill the gap of 
unfilled jobs employers provide.  Third, President Obama hopes to eradicate the 
encouragement of illegal immigration by tackling employers who hire workers with no 
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documentation.  Fourth, the administration seeks to create a system such that immigrants 
without documentation but who are in good standing pay a penalty, learn the English 
language, and eventually gain a pathway to citizenship.  Finally, the Obama 
administration would like to cooperate with Mexico by promoting fiscal development and 
decreasing illegal immigration (The Agenda • Immigration, 2009).   
Under the CBP, the Office of Field Operations (OFO) has the primary 
responsibility of providing border security.  Initiated in November 2005, the Secure 
Border Initiative (SBI) is a key component of the cooperation between both of these 
entities.  SBI incorporates the use of the most advanced technological and tactical 
resources to maintain border security (Secure Border Initiative (SBI) Programs, 2009). 
ICE has an annual budget of $5 billion.  Since 2007, ICE has implemented new 
strategies towards deterring illegal immigration.  These new strategies consist of 
improved management, focusing and targeting the most troublesome illegal immigrants 
as well as employers who violate immigration policies, and decreasing the amount of jobs 
that attract illegal aliens in search of work (Office of Detention & Removal (DRO), 
2009).  These employment opportunities refer to the job magnet, or the strong pull of jobs 
that cause immigrants to illegally cross the border (Kriikorian, 1999).     
II.2 Motivations, Consequences & Factors Behind Illegal Border Crossings 
In the United States, one in ten people are foreign born, and the largest groups are 
from Mexico, China, the Philippines, and India (The SH RM Learning System, 2006).  
Although the world’s population is decreasing in the developed world, it continues to 
grow at a high rate in developing countries.  The discrepancy in population growth is 
projected to speed up the inequality of income and financial opportunity and will cause 
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new pressures for migration and immigration both within and between nations (The SH 
RM Learning System, 2006). 
There are many reasons why people immigrate to America.  For instance, the 
United States and Mexico’s economies play a huge role in whether or not there will be an 
illegal border crossing.  Many immigrants illegally cross the border or overstay their 
visas because they can get higher paying jobs in the United States and thus make more 
money (Abraham, Hamilton, Meissner, Fix, Meyers, & Papademetriou, 2006).  In 2005, 
over 50 percent of illegal migrants in the United States were of Mexican origin (Hanson, 
2007).  Moreover, when Mexico’s wages for its workers decrease, attempts at illegal 
entry into the United States increase (Hanson, 2007).  Therefore, an ailing economy or 
financial hardship is one reason that may motivate a person to risk their life to illegally 
enter the United States.     
The strong desire to be with a friend, loved one, or family member also must not 
be overlooked.  Such sentiments and conviction help justify why the possibility of 
detention and deportation do not prevent potential immigrants from illegal immigration.  
Hence, chain migration is a consequence of illegal border crossings.  
Chain migration refers to a pattern resulting from one person already in the 
country helping a family member or friend enter the country.  In turn, those same family 
members and friends bring their relatives and peers to the same nation or country to join 
them.  In reference to both legal and illegal immigration, chain migration has a long 
history in the United States.  The ability for aliens to utilize chain migration encompasses 
what quantitative studies call a “migrant stock variable” (Wegge, 1998, p. 959).  The 
migrant stock variable represents the summation of all past migrants from a source area 
Ohene-Asah 14
or the total number of previous immigrants in a specific destination country.  Typically it 
“represents the flow information between [immigrants and potential immigrants], or the 
family and friends effect” (Wegge, 1998, p. 959).  In short, if the potential illegal 
immigrant knows someone in or has relatives in the United States the probability of an 
illegal border crossing is increased.  Therefore, the greater and more reliable the flow of 
information in a network is the more likely it is that a migrant in one country will use that 
knowledge as a means towards moving to another unlawfully.  
A factor that indirectly affects illegal border crossings is population growth.  The 
potential impact of Mexico’s population dynamics will be used as an example for 
discussion.  During the latter part of the 20th century, as Mexico’s overall population 
grew faster than the country’s ability to provide jobs millions of illegal workers fled to 
the United States.  Mexico’s government began to encourage the use of and provide 
access to birth control for Mexican families.  In doing so, the average Mexican family has 
decreased from seven children in 1960 to two in 2008 (Lange, 2009, p.1).  
Despite the fact that over 11 million Mexicans left Mexico between 1970 and 
2006 to come to America, some researchers believe that the flow of Mexican migration is 
decreasing.  For example, Lange reports that in 2001 the annual average number of 
Mexicans who left Mexico reached a maximum of 600,000 but has been reduced to 
440,000 in 2006.  Such a decrease in the average amount of border crossings by Mexican 
nationals not only demonstrates the power of population factors but raises questions 
about border security spending such as extended fence construction.  Nevertheless, 
according to Lange the Mexican minimum wage is $4 a day compared to the United 
States’ federal hourly minimum wage of $6.55; this may ensure the continued illegal 
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migration of Mexicans, especially teenagers.  Therefore, hundreds of thousands of 
Mexicans may continue to cross the border for the foreseeable future (Lange, 2009, p. 3).  
As population growth slows, however, this decreases the labor supply rendering labor 
more valuable, hence wages will increase in Mexico and we should expect a further 
slowing of out-migration as a consequence. 
Economic motivations, chain migration, which is a consequence of illegal border 
crossings, and population growth factors impact migration rates.  Other influential 
elements include political stability, the protection of civil rights, and other conditions that 
contribute to quality of life such as education, health care, and infrastructure. 
II.3 Human Smuggling  
Since 9/11 the United States government has consistently increased its spending 
on border security.  However, since the southern and northern borders of America are not 
permanently sealed, holes still exist for illegal immigrants to exploit and penetrate.   
Border security and illegal immigration require examination of the means by 
which an illegal immigrant may enter America.  One method illegal immigrants may use 
to enter the United States that is an issue of concern is human smuggling.  The Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) estimates human smuggling to be a multi-billion-dollar 
revenue generating business.  While the fee for undocumented Mexicans to be smuggled 
across the border has risen from a couple hundred dollars to over a thousand dollars, 
people other than Mexicans (OTMs) pay at least ten times more than the normal base rate 
to be snuck into America.  Some of the methods used by human smuggling networks 
include the use of adjusted tractor trailers with concealed sections for migrant 
transportation through legal ports of entry, working under the guise of legitimate 
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businesses, companies, and agencies and producing high-quality counterfeit 
documentation (Ewing, 2006, p. 6).   
The policies regarding border security and illegal immigration have the potential 
to impact the lives of Americans and the United States economy.  Therefore, in order to 
make prudent public policy decisions, the overall ability to reduce illegal border 
crossings must be assessed. 
II.4 The Three Policy Strategies of the PAIIP Model 
The PAIIP model simulates individually and in various combinations the policies 
of detention, deportation, and amnesty.  The purpose of this section is to justify the 
incorporation of each policy into the PAIIP model as well as the theory behind its design.  
By discussing and comprehending the strengths and weakness of each policy better 
analysis of the PAIIP model’s results will be achieved.     
II.4.1 Detention and Deportation  
The penalty for illegal entry into the United States is detention followed by 
deportation.  Various facilities in the United States hold illegal immigrants such as the 
Corrections Corporation of America and the Geo Group.  Although detention is a strong 
deterrent for illegal border crossings, the cost of maintaining this policy raises questions 
about its long-term effectiveness.  The cost of a detention policy is very high.  With 
nearly 30,000 illegal immigrants held on a nightly basis for an average cost of $95 per 
person the total yearly cost for detention is $1 billion.  Instead of an increase in the 
number of people illegally entering the United States more prison space is needed due to 
the high number of illegal residents living in America and the expected increase in 
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apprehensions at the border (Kolodner, 2006).  The United States government wants to 
place more immigrants in detention as they wait for their hearings, particularly those who 
are not from Mexico; the government no longer wants to discharge them “on their own 
recognizance, [because they] intend to end [what was previously known as] the catch and 
release era” (Kolodner, 2006).    
The Office of Detention and Removal (DRO) has the primary responsibility of 
deporting the illegal immigrants they identify and apprehend.  Although deportation is a 
strong and effective method for penalizing illegal immigrants, this policy has 
weaknesses.  Once Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 there 
has been a strong stream of illegal immigrants into the United States (Immigration 
Control, 1989).  Because the process of deportation encompasses a judicial process, 
wherein a judge must decree the order of removal for an apprehended illegal immigrant, 
one of the main weaknesses for the policy of deportation is time.  For example, the 
process of deporting an illegal immigrant may take five years or more.  Since thousands 
of immigrants are deported annually, this research study assumes that the average time it 
takes to deport an illegal immigrant is one year. The reason for this time delay may be 
attributed to the   
coordination and liaison with foreign government officials and embassies 
to obtain travel documents and country clearances, coordinating complex 
logistical and transportation issues to repatriate the alien and, if required 
[the] DRO officers escort the alien to his or her foreign country (Office of 
Detention and Removal, 2009). 
 
Despite the fact that deportation may be a time-consuming process its main 
strength is that it deters immigrants from violating United States immigration law.  
Human smugglers are also a subset of all those deported.  Lastly, immigrants deported 
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from the United States are ineligible to return for a minimum time period of five years; 
the maximum penalty is life (Eschbach, Hagan, & Rodriguez, 2008).  
II.4.2 Amnesty 
The Department of Homeland Security, Immigration & Customs Enforcement 
(ICE), and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) have been revamped with the purpose 
of securing the United States’ borders, wherein the penalty for apprehension is detention 
and deportation.  However, another policy alternative that is presently in debate as a 
deterrent for illegal immigration is amnesty.   
When the government pardons illegal immigrants for violating immigration laws 
that act is known as amnesty.  The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), 
the first United States amnesty act, was passed with the goal of controlling and deterring 
illegal immigration to the United States.  It is estimated that under the IRCA of 1986, 
three million aliens were granted amnesty, and the two groups of illegal immigrants who 
were eligible for it were those considered residents of the United States before January 1, 
1982 (Rytina, 2002, p. 2).   Seasonal agricultural workers who were employed for at least 
three months prior to May, 1986 were legalized as well (Rytina, 2002).   
Massey (2005) asserts that the IRCA of 1986 had four goals.  First, the IRCA 
sanctioned employers who hired undocumented workers.  Second, more resources were 
allocated to the Border Patrol.   Third, it granted legalization to undocumented 
immigrants who could prove that they continuously resided in the United States for five 
years, as well as migrant farm workers.  Finally, the IRCA expanded the executive 
authority of the President to declare an “immigration emergency” in the event of an 
actual anticipated increase in the entry of migrants into the United States (Massey, 2005).   
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According to President Obama, “if the American people don't feel like you can 
secure the borders, then it's hard to strike a deal that would get people out of the shadows 
and on a pathway to citizenship who are already here” (Hsu, 2009).  With illegal 
immigration yet again being a controversial topic many policy analysts and scholars are 
debating whether amnesty should be granted again.   A key element in this debate is 
whether or not the IRCA of 1986 actually deterred illegal border crossings in subsequent 
years.  The IRCA of 1986 impacted legal immigration because amnestied aliens, as long 
as they possess permanent resident status or naturalized citizenship, have been fully 
eligible to sponsor additional immigrants (Rytina, 2001, p. 5).  Sponsorship is not open to 
anyone; it is predicated on whether a person has been granted citizenship or permanent 
legal residence, and the specific family member sought after to be legally brought over 
into the United States.   Hence, through subsequent chain migration, the policy of 
amnesty enables legal migration.   
 Amnesty is a complex debate with many sides.  There are several different ideas 
being proposed.  People support different legislation or ideas with various conditions. 
There are proponents and opponents of different amnesty proposals.  While the views of 
proponents delineate the strength of an amnesty policy, the stance of its opponents 
highlights the weaknesses of legalization as well.  General amnesty supporters consist of 
labor unions such as the AFL-CIO, religious institutions such as Christian coalition 
groups and the Catholic Church, and Congress members such as Senator Richard Durbin.  
Immigration lobbyists for amnesty also encompass business and human rights 
organizations.   
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One of the main reasons that there are amnesty advocates is that they believe it 
would “save politically unacceptable mass deportations” (Hanson, 2007, p. 30).  Other 
arguments people make for amnesty is that it prevents the exploitation of illegal 
immigrants who employers knowingly hire, and it keeps families together, especially 
those with children.  Families in this situation are referred to as mixed-status families 
(Gonzalez, 2009).  The Pew Hispanic Center reports that nearly four million children in 
the United States have at least one parent who illegally entered and is not a citizen; 80 
percent of these children live in two-parent family homes (Drash, 2009).     
Amnesty opponents do not approve of rewarding violators of immigration law 
with a pathway to citizenship (Hanson, 2007).  Many opponents point towards the surge 
in illegal immigration after the IRCA of 1986 was passed as proof that legalization does 
not work (Hanson, 2007, p. 30).  Opponents of legalization would like to see a shift 
towards the creation of more jobs for American citizens.  They are also weary of the cost 
for legalization programs.  Ten years (1987-1997) after the United States granted 
amnesty to illegal immigrants the Center for Immigration Studies did a study and found 
that the cost of legalization was approximately $78.7 billion (Simcox, 1997).  Factoring 
in the indirect and downstream costs the study revealed that the amnestied population 
accounted for an estimated $102.1 billion in 20 federal, state, and local assistance 
programs and services and that the $78 billion in paid total taxes resulted in a ten-year 
fiscal deficit of $24 billion in the public assistance and services portion of the budget 
(Simcox, 1997).  Instead of this financial burden, amnesty opponents advocate that more 
fiscal resources be allocated towards border security such as an increase in border patrol 
agents, fence building, and innovative technologies.   
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Immigration policy reform is open to criticism no matter what the policy remedy. 
In reference to amnesty, the ramifications of any type of legalization program must be 
thoroughly assessed.      
II.5 Border Security Spending vs Illegal Immigrant Apprehension: A Linear 
Regression Approach 
The purpose of this section is to ascertain whether or not spending more money 
on border security results in a significant deterrence in illegal immigration.  
Apprehension, detention and deportation, and Border Patrol require funding.  For 
example, “in 2006, with the already huge increases in spending, the flow of illegal 
immigrants across the southern border (as measured by apprehensions) fell by 27 
percent” (Hanson, 2007, p. 25).   
Table 1 
 
   Total    Total 
US Border  Deportable Aliens  Linear Regression of Deportable  
Year Patrol Budget Located By US Border Patrol Aliens [ y= 1,405,752 + (-1.0568E-4x) ] 
1992 $400,000,000  1,199,560   1,363,480 
1993 $350,000,000  1,263,490   1,368,764 
1994 $400,000,000  1,031,668   1,363,480 
1995 $470,000,000  1,324,202   1,356,082 
1996 $550,000,000  1,549,876   1,347,628 
1997 $720,000,000  1,412,953   1,329,662 
1998 $850,000,000  1,555,776   1,315,924 
1999 $870,000,000  1,579,010   1,313,810 
2000 $1,020,000,000  1,676,438   1,297,958 
2001 $1,120,000,000  1,266,214   1,287,390 
2002 $1,140,000,000  955,310   1,256,742 
2003 $1,140,000,000  931,557   1,256,742 
2004 $1,200,000,000  1,160,395   1,278,935 
2005 $1,510,000,000  1,189,031   1,246,174 
2006 $1,580,000,000  1,089,096   1,238,777 
2007 $1,940,000,000  876,803   1,200,732 
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The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) provides statistics on deportable 
aliens located by the border patrol sector each year.  The border patrol is spread out 
through numerous locations in the United States.  In Appendix A, Table 3 indicates how 
the Border Patrol breaks down its patrolling areas into two sectors, the southwest sector 
and other sectors.  The southwest sector consists of cities in the states of California, 
Arizona, and Texas such as San Diego, Tucson, and El Paso, respectively.  The other 
sectors encompass different cities such as Buffalo, New York, Miami, Florida, and 
Swanton, Vermont. 
The exponential growth in the amount of money spent on border patrol raises the 
question of whether the United States has been able to successfully deter immigrants 
from illegally crossing the border, and locate illegal aliens residing in the United States.   
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A linear regression T Test was used to assess cost effectiveness of border security 
spending versus the number of deportable aliens located by the Border Patrol.   The 
equation of the linear regression line was plotted in the form y = B0 + B1x.  All original 
and projected data have been recorded in Table 1 and plotted in Chart 1 of this section.   
The focus of the linear regression T Test is the slope, B1, of the regression line; it 
is also referred to as the regression coefficient.  The regression coefficient for this 
statistical analysis is important because it provides insight into the relationship between 
border patrol spending and the apprehension of illegal immigrants.  A B1 greater than 
zero denotes a positive and direct relationship between spending and deportable alien 
apprehension; this implies that an increase in spending results in an increase of 
apprehensions.  A B1 lower than zero indicates a negative and inverse relationship 
between spending and apprehension; thus an increase in spending results in a decrease of 
deportable aliens apprehended.    Finally a B1 equal to zero implies no relationship 
between apprehension and spending.   
 The equation for the regression line is y = 1,405,752 + (-1.0568E-4x); it was 
derived from the plotted data for the dependent variable, Deportable Aliens Located by 
Program and Border Patrol Sector and Investigation, and the independent variable, 
United States Border Patrol Budget, from 1992-2007.    The linear regression equation is 
also a cost function, Deportable Aliens Located = f($); inputting the border patrol budget 
values into the cost function, Y = f(X1, X2,…Xn), provides the projected annual number 
of deportable aliens located by the border patrol.  
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The results from the Linear Regression T Test show that B1 is equal to -1.056E-4, 
and that the regression equation projects a downward slope for the plotted data.  The 
standard error for the regression equation, s, is 227,094.  The standard error for the slope, 
sb1, is 5.3778E-5.  The test statistic, t, is -1.9651; the P-value, p is .0348; and the degrees 
of freedom, df, is 14.  The correlation coefficient (goodness of the fit) for the regression 
line, r2, is .22, or 22%.  The results from the Linear Regression T Test indicate that there 
is an inverse relationship between border patrol spending and apprehension; the 
exponential increase in border patrol spending does not correlate with an increase in 
apprehensions.   
According to Massey (2005), the cost for the apprehension of an illegal immigrant 
by the Border Patrol has increased from $300 in 1992 to $1,700 in 2002.  The increase in 
border enforcement has pushed immigration rates to more remote locations; this has 
resulted in a higher rate of death along the border, forced illegal immigrants to remain in 
the United States longer, and caused a significant decline in apprehension rates (Massey, 
2005).     
The linear regression technique used in this section is a simple analytical tool 
used for projection.  The results from this method are merely theoretical.  Since the type 
of deportable alien located by the Border Patrol is not reported in the data set used the 
policy analysis technique of a Linear Regression T Test is neither strong enough to help 
understand the broader scope of illegal immigration nor provide viable policy 
recommendations.  However, this technique does form a foundation towards further 
research on the problem of illegal immigration.   
Ohene-Asah 25
Consequently, another relevant policy analysis technique is systems modeling.  
Therefore, the construction of causal loop diagrams was a crucial piece towards 
developing the PAIIP model.   
II.6 Causal Loop Diagrams  
Causal Loop Diagram 1 (CLD 1) captures the main argument of this research 
study and the driving force behind the PAIIP model.  CLD 1 has a reinforcing loop.  The 
impact of one variable on another variable along a reinforcing loop may be uniformly 
positive or negative, positive meaning that an increase in one variable causes the other to 
increase, or negative implying that an increase in a variable causes the other to decrease.     
CLD 1 asserts that an increase in border crossivity causes an increase in the entry 
of unauthorized immigrants into the United States and that an increase in the entry of 
unauthorized immigrants causes an increase in border crossivity.   Border crossivity 
represents communication between immigrants who reside in the United States and those 
who live outside of America.  More reliable and qualitative the content of the discussion 
and information between actual illegal immigrants and potential illegal immigrants 
stimulates illegal border crossings and contributes towards the undocumented population 
in the United States.  Edwards (2006) argues that both legal and illegal immigration are 
inextricably related.  He also asserts that chain migration connects legal and illegal 
immigration; this implies that even though immigrants who either obtain citizenship or 
come to America legally may bring over their relatives and friends there are still 
instances in which legal and illegal immigrants contribute towards illegal border 
crossings.  
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Causal Loop Diagram 1 
Entry of Unauthorized
Immigrant Population
Border Crossivity
+
+
Reinforcing Loop I
 
Causal Loop Diagram 2 (CLD 2) is an expansion of CLD 1.  CLD 2 has a 
balancing loop.  Variables along a balancing loop are neither uniformly positive nor 
negative.  The causal relationship between variables along a balancing loop is both 
positive and negative.  Thus, as one variable increases, it may cause the other to increase 
or decrease.       
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Casual Loop Diagram 2 
Entry of Unauthorized
Immigrant Population
Border Crossivity
+
+
Reinforcing Loop I
Border Patrol
Budget
Deportable Aliens Locted
By Border Patrol Sector
Detention &
Deportation
+
+
+
-
Balancing Loop 1
 
CLD 2 illustrates the relationship between border patrol spending and 
apprehension.  CLD 2 asserts that an increase in the entry of unauthorized immigrants 
causes an increase in the Border Patrol’s budget.  An increase in the Border Patrol’s 
budget causes an increase in the deportable aliens located.  An increase in the number of 
deportable aliens located causes an increase in detention and deportation, and an increase 
in detention and deportation causes a decrease in the entry of unauthorized immigrants.    
Although an increase in spending should cause an increase in apprehensions this research 
study argues that an increase in spending does not correlate with an increase in 
apprehensions.  Chart 1 below demonstrates and supports this argument. 
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    Since 1965, American immigration laws encouraged the reunification of 
families and thus provided a mechanism for migrants with family ties to legal aliens to 
chain migration (Wegge, 1998). Yet, immigrants are still illegally crossing the border or 
overstaying their visas making it very arduous for the government to adequately respond 
with the necessary and proper legislation to deter this behavior in a timely fashion.  
Balancing Loop 2 in Casual Loop Diagram 3, CLD 3, tries to capture the difficulties of 
the government’s response to illegal border crossings.   
CLD 3 is an expansion of CLD 2 and is the final causal loop diagram of this 
section.  With the third and final piece incorporated, CLD 3 argues that the entry of 
unauthorized immigrants causes an increase in border security, and an increase in border 
security causes a decrease in the entry of unauthorized immigrants.  The increase in 
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border security may stem from new legislation or mandates from the government, the 
allocation of more money, or the strategic movement of funds to programs and initiatives 
that work best.  However, sometimes there tends to be a delay in legislation to fight 
illegal immigration.  One reason for the delay is attributed to the policy cycle and its 
ability to respond to illegal immigration and border security measures in a timely fashion.   
For example, the creation of the Department of Homeland Security after September 11, 
2001, took time as various agencies were reorganized.  Another reason for the delay may 
be the current amnesty debate. 
Causal Loop Diagram 3 
Entry of Unauthorized
Immigrant Population
Border Crossivity
+
+
Reinforcing Loop I
Border Patrol
Budget
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+
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Border Security
+
-
Balancing Loop 2
Delay attributed to policy cycle in response to
border security and illegal immigration, and the
implemenation of legislation that comes from
Congress such as Amnesty Proposals.
 
 
With a single reinforcing loop and two balancing loops, the components of CLD 3 
illustrate the political, economic, and social impact of illegal migration on border 
security.  Most importantly, CLD 3 provides a framework towards understanding the 
PAIIP model and attempts to describe the causes and effects that stimulate the entry of 
illegal immigrants.   
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III. Research Questions 
As we have seen, the United States government, although it relies on several 
others as well, has focused on three policies – detention and deportation, and amnesty – 
in its effort to reduce illegal migration.  Since the United States government has increased 
its spending on border security, it is important to know which policy or combination of 
polices work best at reducing illegal border crossings.  The PAIIP model will try to 
illustrate the following:  
1. Which policy or combination of policies has the best chance of limiting illegal 
migration? 
The PAIIP model is an illustrative policy analysis tool that was developed to 
primarily study the impact of detention and deportation and amnesty on the 
communication between potential and actual illegal immigrants, as well as how these 
policies affect illegal border crossings.  The results from the PAIIP model’s cases will 
provide an innovative way to examine the problem(s) behind border security and illegal 
immigration. 
2. What does the United States government, its organizations, and agencies that 
provide border security need to be successful at executing their agenda and 
goals?   
The cost to apprehend, detain, and deport illegal immigrants continues to increase.  
For instance, in 2001 the Immigration and Naturalization Service spent $4.2 billion on 
border and interior enforcement which included the detention and removal of illegal 
aliens.  Such spending on detention and deportation factor into the debate on amnesty, 
especially since the IRCA of 1986’s ratification has cost taxpayers billions of dollars.  
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Furthermore, some opponents of legalization do not see the logic in spending taxpayer 
money on border security and then rewarding non-citizens with a pathway to citizenship.  
Therefore, in reference to border security spending, detention and deportation, and the 
amnesty debate, the PAIIP model’s results will be interpreted to address the resources 
border security needs to be successful in achieving its goals.  
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IV. Methods 
In order to understand the immigration problem it is important to understand what 
causes illegal entry into the United States.  Some of the reasons that cause illegal entry 
are: 
a. There exist three primary smuggling corridors along the southern border of the 
United States: the South Texas, West Texas/New Mexico, and California/Arizona 
corridors.   
b.  Illegal migration is motivated by the search for employment in the United States 
and other factors such as education, healthcare, and political asylum.  
c. Chain migration is a consequence of illegal crossings.  
d. Population growth is a factor towards illegal migration.   
e. Human smuggling is an annual billion dollar enterprise immigrants use to 
illegally penetrate the United States’ borders.   
Causal Loop Diagram 3 (CLD 3) delineates how communication between 
potential and actual illegal immigrants stimulates the entry of illegal immigrants.  CLD 3 
also describes the impact of government legislation and border security spending on the 
entry of unauthorized immigrants.  However, a causal loop diagram is a limited means for 
providing an explanation for the immigration problem because the dynamics of illegal 
immigration are very complex.  Therefore, using systems dynamic modeling helps 
increase our understanding of the situation and will better assist policymakers, CBP, and 
ICE towards dealing with the problem of illegal immigration and most importantly help 
secure the United States’ borders.  Using secondary data analysis, the purpose of the 
methodology in this study is to compare and contrast border patrol spending versus 
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illegal immigrant apprehension, and to simulate the effects of detention and deportation 
and amnesty on the communication between potential and actual illegal immigrants, and 
illegal border crossings.  The steps are outlined below.  
1. Immigration and border security data were collected from the United States’ 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) website and the Data360 website. 
2. The data from the DHS and Data360 website were plotted on a graph.  The data 
was used to perform a Hypothesis Test for the Slope of a Regression Line, also 
referred to as a Linear Regression T Test.  
3. The results from the Linear Regression T Test were plotted in the form                
Y = B0 + B1X.  B0 is a constant.  B1 is the slope or regression coefficient.  X, 
border patrol spending, is the value of the independent variable.  Y, deportable 
aliens located, is the value of the dependent variable.   
4. There were two hypotheses:  
The null hypothesis  H0: B1 = 0 
The alternative hypothesis  Ha: Β1 < 0  
5. The null hypothesis, H0, was rejected, and the alternative hypothesis, Ha, was 
accepted.  
6. Causal loop diagrams were designed and developed to explain the theory behind 
the PAIIP model and some of the political, economic, and social issues 
surrounding border security and illegal immigration.   
7. A systems model entitled the Potential Actual Illegal Immigration Population 
(PAIIP) model was designed to simulate communication between potential and 
actual illegal immigrants and illegal border crossings. 
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8. The PAIIP model has two cases: Detention and Deportation and Detention and 
Deportation with Amnesty  
9. Discussion and analysis on the dynamics of the PAIIP model and its two cases. 
IV.1 Systems Modeling for Illegal Border Entry 
The PAIIP model was developed using systems modeling as a policy analysis tool 
that may be applied towards understanding the dynamics of illegal border crossings.  
First, the PAIIP model’s origins and its connection to terrorism are articulated.  Next, this 
section presents the dynamic hypothesis of the PAIIP model.  Then, the mathematics 
behind the base case’s design and ability to simulate illegal migration are presented.   
Finally, the building block models for the PAIIP model’s cases are discussed. 
IV.1.1 Potential Actual Illegal Immigration Population (PAIIP) Model & 
Its Connection to Terrorism 
The PAIIP model originated from the concept and design of Kermack and 
McKendrick’s (1927) SIR model and the Bass Diffusion model.  Sterman (2000) states 
that in a systems model, stocks are accumulations that characterize the state of the system 
and generate the information upon which decisions and actions are based and that flows 
drive the rate at which stocks change.  During a model simulation or run for policy 
analysis, policy levers are tools that a policy actor/decision maker may adjust by either 
increasing or decreasing to observe what the policy implications are for the chosen 
variable(s).   
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The “SIR model, which stands for Susceptible population, S, the Infectious 
population, I, and the Recovered Population, R, is a model for understanding the 
dynamics of epidemic diseases” (Sterman, 2000, p. 303).   
[The] Bass Diffusion model simulates the phenomena of rumor spreading 
and new ideas, the adoption of new technologies, and the growth of new 
products, because they too may be viewed as epidemics (Sterman, 2000, p. 
323).    
 
While the SIR model has three stocks, two flows, and four policy levers, the Bass 
Diffusion model has two stocks and three policy levers.   
Since policymakers are concerned that terrorists may use the same illicit methods 
as illegal immigrants to enter the United States, the PAIIP model’s cases become 
analytical tools that may help the government, ICE, and CBP deter or prevent terrorism.   
For instance, in the PAIIP model base case the process of detention and deportation 
delineates how an actual illegal immigrant or terrorist is apprehended, deported, and 
returned into the potential illegal immigrant population.  Yet, detention and deportation 
are only two strategies towards deterring illegal immigration and the potential threat of 
terrorism.  The policy of amnesty is incorporated into the PAIIP model’s second case as 
well.   
IV.1.2 Dynamic Hypothesis 
The key behind the PAIIP model’s dynamic hypothesis of communication 
between potential and actual illegal immigrants lies within the fundamental assumption 
of the Bass Diffusion model.  The Bass Diffusion model, which has a Potential Adopters 
stock and an Actual Adopters stock, is based on the assumption that the adoption of a 
product or service such as cable television is attributed to the spread of the service by 
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word of mouth.  Moreover,  “there are several channels of awareness that can stimulate 
early adoption of new innovations besides word of mouth and related feedback effects 
that depend on the size of the adopter population, such as adversting, media reports, and 
direct sales efforts” (Sterman, 2000, p. 332).   
The dynamic hypothesis of the PAIIP model is that: 
The communication between illegal aliens in the United States and potential 
aliens outside the United States via word of mouth in all its forms, verbal, 
manual, or digital, stimulates illegal border entry and activity. 
IV.2 Detention and Deportation (Base Case) Explanation 
This section discusses and presents the mathematical formulas that enable the 
calculation of the variables in the PAIIP model’s base case.  The base case is important 
because the second case is derived from it1.   
PIIP =  ∫ ( -BCR, N - AIIP0 - IIAP0 ) 
AIIP  =  ∫ ( BCR – AR, AIIP0 ) 
IIAP = ∫ ( AR, AIIP0 ) 
The communication between the AIIP and the PIIP is captured by the parameter 
Illegal Immigration Contact Rate, iicr.  This form of communication is analogous to word 
of mouth via various modes of communication such as telephones, the Internet, and 
written letters.  Therefore, the PIIP generates: PIIP*iicr contacts per time period.   
The time period for this model is the amount of people contacted over the course 
of a year between the AIIP and the PIIP.  Border crossivity, which is the probability of a 
random encounter between a person from the AIIP and the PIIP, makes the PIIP 
                                                 
1
 Potential Illegal Immigrant Population = PIIP, Actual Illegal Immigrant Population = 
AIIP, Illegal Immigrant Apprehension Population = IIAP, Border Crossing Rate = BCR, 
Apprehension Rate = AR, Total Population = N 
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susceptible towards crossing the border.  The probability of a random encounter is, 
AIIP/N. 
The IIAP is based on the percentage of AIIP caught at the border.  To get the 
actual value of the amount of time it takes to rid the country of illegal aliens, one needs to 
know how long it takes for a person to be deported and sent back into the PIIP.  
Therefore, the delay fixed function is used in the base case because it takes time to locate, 
apprehend, and deport an illegal alien after he or she crosses the border.  
IV.3 Potential Actual Illegal Immigration Model (PAIIP) Building Block Model 
(BBM) 
The Potential Actual Illegal Immigration (PAIIP) model has two distinct cases.  
This section discusses the building block models for both of them.  Building block 
models are analogous to blueprints; they are descriptive outlines and maps that provide 
both the systems modeler and policy actor with a detailed visual of a systems model.  In 
this section, the concept, diagram, and units of each case will be presented and will assist 
in providing a stronger comprehension of the feedback mechanisms behind the function 
and design of the PAIIP model. 
IV.3.1 Detention and Deportation Building Block Model Description 
(BBM)  
The primary purpose behind the application of the Bass Diffusion model to border 
security and illegal immigration is to examine the issue of communication and contact 
between actual and potential illegal immigrants.  Since CLD 1 asserts that an increase in 
border crossivity (bc) causes an increase in the entry of illegal immigrants, an illegal 
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immigration contact rate (iicr) parameter was embedded into the Detention and 
Deportation base case’s design.  The border crossivity and iicr policy levers are both key 
variables in the PAIIP model’s base case.  They may be adjusted to illustrate how the 
content of information and contact between actual and potential illegal immigrants 
creates and impacts border crossings.  Though the argument about the quality of 
information and contact between actual and illegal immigrants is not measurable or 
quantifiable, the role of the border crossivity and iicr policy levers in the PAIIP model is 
to attempt to theoretically simulate the phenomena of information communicated 
between actual and potential illegal immigrants.   
The values for the border crossivity and iicr are inputted into the PAIIP model, 
and they have units of percentage and population per year respectively.   While border 
crossivity is based on a scale from 0 to 100%, the iicr ranges from 0 to whatever number 
a policy actor selects.  A border crossivity or iicr value of 0 implies no communication 
and results in no illegal activity.  However, so long as the iicr is greater than zero, when 
the border crossivity policy lever is increased, border crossings occur.  The maximum 
value of 100% for the border crossivity variable implies that the most reliable and best 
information is being provided by the actual illegal immigrant to the potential one.  Thus, 
an increase in border crossivity represents an increase in the quality of information shared 
between actual and potential illegal immigrants; the stronger the content of information is 
the greater the probability that an illegal crossing will take place. 
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Causal Loop Diagram 1 
Entry of Unauthorized
Immigrant Population
Border Crossivity
+
+
Reinforcing Loop I
 
CLD 2 encompasses the dynamic of apprehension and detention and deportation.  
It also asserts the argument that an increase in these policies decreases the entry of illegal 
immigrants.  In the base case, the border crossivity and iicr variables affect, or are 
impacted by, these factors incorporated into the model as stocks, flows, and other policy 
levers.  Moreover, these additional variables highlighted in CLD 2 provide a foundation 
for analysis of the PAIIP model’s behavior and results.  Hence, the base case has three 
stocks, three flow variables, and three more additional policy levers.   
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Casual Loop Diagram 2 
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The Potential Illegal Immigrant Population (PIIP), the Actual Illegal Immigrant 
Population (AIIP), and the Illegal Immigrant Apprehension Population (IIAP) represent 
the stocks of the Detention and Deportation base case.  In the PAIIP model’s base case, 
Potential Adopters was replaced with the PIIP stock, and Actual Adopters was replaced 
with AIIP stock.  Given that the SIR model is analogous to the Bass Diffusion model, the 
PIIP and AIIP stocks in the PAIIP model’s base case also replace the Susceptible 
Population and Infected Population stocks in the SIR model.  The units for the PIIP, 
AIIP, and IIAP stocks are population.  Any value equal to or greater than 0 may be 
inputted for them.  Thus, the number of border crossings not only depends on border 
crossivity and the iicr but also on the size of the AIIP and PIIP.       
Each stock in the Detention and Deportation model is connected by a flow.  There 
are three flow variables in the model: the Border Crossing Rate (BCR), the Apprehension 
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Rate (AR), and the Deportation Rate (DR).  The units of each flow, BCR, AR, and DR 
are population per year.  These flow variables are calculated by the PAIIP model.  What 
determines and affects their behavior are the various policy levers that can be adjusted 
during a run or simulation of the model.  The primary policy levers that directly affect the 
BCR, which in turn is dependent on the size of the AIIP and PIIP, are the border 
crossivity, iicr, and Total Population (N).   
Like the SIR and Bass Diffusion models, the PAIIP model has a Total Population 
policy lever.  The Total Population’s value is inputted and adjusted by the user.  If this 
parameter is set to zero, no activity occurs.  Given that the SIR model predicts the 
infection rate, and the Bass Diffusion model projects an adoption rate, the power of the 
bass model’s incorporation into the PAIIP model is that it enables the calculation, 
simulation, and projection of the amount of illegal border crossings based on the total 
population of illegal immigrants assumed to be communicating with each other.  In 
addition, the Bass Diffusion model helps simulate the probability that there will be 
sufficient enough information for an attempt at illegal entry into the United States.  
Therefore, the rate of illegal entry is captured by the border crossing rate flow variable.   
The apprehension rate is a flow and the Illegal Immigrant Apprehension 
Population (IIAP) is a stock because “the SIR model’s recovered population is often 
termed ‘removals’ and the recovery rate is then called the removal rate” (Sterman, 2000, 
p. 304).   The apprehension rate has a unit of population per year and flows into the IIAP.  
Out of the IIAP is a deportation rate flow because prior to removal or deportation an 
illegal immigrant or terrorist must be apprehended and detained prior to deportation.  The 
apprehension rate is based on the percentage of actual illegal immigrants of which some 
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may be possible terrorists who are caught, and the deportation rate, which has units of 
population per year, has a deportation delay because sometimes it takes a year or more 
for an illegal immigrant to be deported.   
During a model simulation the apprehension percentage and deportation delay 
serve as policy levers that may be adjusted to study the impact on the PAIIP model base 
case’s stocks and flows.  The Apprehension Rate, AR, has one policy lever, entitled 
apprehension percentage.  The Deportation Rate has one policy lever entitled deportation 
delay.  The unit of the deportation delay is year(s). 
The driving mechanisms behind the PAIIP model’s cases are feedback loops.  For 
the Detention and Deportation base case the nature of the loops will be explained.  There 
are two balancing loops and one reinforcing loop.  The first loop is a balancing loop 
which is labeled on the model as Depletion of PIIP.  As the PIIP increases, the BCR 
increases; as the BCR increases, the PIIP decreases.  The second loop is a reinforcing 
loop entitled Increase in AIIP.  As the AIIP increases, the BCR increases; as the BCR 
increases the AIIP increases.   The third loop is a reinforcing loop, entitled Depletion of 
AIIP.  As AIIP increases, AR increases.  As AR increases, AIIP decreases.  These three 
loops are the driving force of the base and extended cases.  Other notable feedback 
elements in the Detention and Deportation model are the AR which feeds into DR, and 
the IIAP which feeds back into PIIP via the deportation rate.   
The feedback loops in the PAIIP model’s base case support the arguments stated 
in CLD 1 and CLD 2.  Based on the values inputted into the variables of the PAIIP 
model’s cases, the results produced reveal how the content of information communicated 
between actual and potential illegal immigrants stimulates illegal immigration and is 
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affected by public policies.  Therefore, the slightest change in the value of one stock or 
policy lever changes the dynamic and behavior of the stocks and rates of the PAIIP 
model.   For example, increasing or decreasing the apprehension percentage affects all of 
the population stocks and rates.  Thus, many simulations with various variable inputs 
were run for the base case.     
PAIIP Model 
Base Case #1: Detention and Deportation 
Variable      Type  Units 
Potential Illegal Immigrant Population (PAIIP)  Stock  Population   
Actual Illegal Immigrant Population (AIIP)  Stock  Population 
Illegal Immigrant Apprehension Population (IIAP) Stock  Population 
Border Crossing Rate (BCR)    Flow  Population per year 
Apprehension Rate (AR)    Flow  Population per year 
Deportation Rate (DR)     Flow  Population per year 
Illegal Immigration Contact Rate (iicr)   Policy Lever Population per year 
Total Population (N)     Policy Lever Population 
Border Crossivity (bc)     Policy Lever Percentage 
Apprehension Percentage    Policy Lever Percentage 
Deportation Delay     Policy Lever Year(s)  
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Base Case #1: Detention and Deportation 
Potential Illegal
Immigrant
Population PIIP
Actual Illegal
Immigrant
Population AIIPBorder Crossing
Rate BCR
Illegal Immigration
Contact Rate iicr
Total Population N
Border
Crossitivity bc
+
Depletion of PIIP
Increase in AIIP
+ Illegal Immigrant
Apprehension
Population IIAPApprehension
Rate AR
+
Depletion of AIIP
deportation rate
apprehension
percentage
deportation delay
    
IV.3.2 Detention and Deportation with Amnesty Building Block Model 
Description (BBM)    
The second case is Detention and Deportation with Amnesty.  Adding the policy 
of amnesty in this case flows right into the argument expressed in CLD 3.  The amnesty 
rate flow variable, amnesty percentage policy lever, and Amnesty Population (AP) stock 
were added to assess their impact on the content of communication between potential and 
actual illegal immigrants as well as the border crossing rate.  In addition, the border 
crossivity due to AP (Amnesty Population) was set from a range of 0 to 10%.  The 
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concept behind the border crossivity due to AP parameter is that as the amnesty 
population increases, the border crossivity variable should increase because word would 
be spreading that the United States is granting amnesty to illegal immigrants.  Likewise, 
as the Amnesty Population decreases, the border crossivity parameter should decrease.   
Causal Loop Diagram 3 
Entry of Unauthorized
Immigrant Population
Border Crossivity
+
+
Reinforcing Loop I
Border Patrol
Budget
Deportable Aliens Locted
By Border Patrol Sector
Detention &
Deportation
+
+
+
-
Balancing Loop 1
Border Security
+
-
Balancing Loop 2
Delay attributed to policy cycle in response to
border security and illegal immigration, and the
implemenation of legislation that comes from
Congress such as Amnesty Proposals.
 
 
The AP has units of population.  Like the other three population stock variables, 
the AP’s initial value may be set by the policy actor.  Out of the AIIP stock is an 
Amnesty rate flow variable which has units of population per year.  The amnesty rate is 
calculated by the PAIIP model, but it is directly influenced by the amnesty percentage 
policy lever that it is connected to it.  The amnesty percentage is inputted by the policy 
actor between the values of 0 to 100%.  The amnesty rate flows into the AP stock.  The 
border crossivity due to AP feeds back into the border crossivity variable which feeds 
back into the BCR.   
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PAIIP Model 
Case #2: Amnesty with Deportation 
Variable      Type   Units 
Potential Illegal Immigrant Population (PAIIP)  Stock   Population  
Actual Illegal Immigrant Population (AIIP)  Stock   Population 
Illegal Immigrant Apprehension Population (IIAP) Stock   Population 
Amnesty Population (AP)    Stock   Population 
Border Crossing Rate (BCR)    Flow         Population per year 
Amnesty rate      Flow         Population per year 
Apprehension Rate (AR)    Flow         Population per year 
Deportation Rate (DR)     Flow         Population per year 
Illegal Immigration Contact Rate (iicr)   Policy Lever        Population per year 
Total Population (N)     Policy Lever  Population 
Border Crossivity (bc)     Policy Lever  Percentage 
Apprehension Percentage    Policy Lever  Percentage 
Amnesty Percentage     Policy Lever  Percentage 
Border crossivity due to AP    Feedback Parameter Percentage 
Deportation Delay     Policy Lever  Year(s)  
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Case #2: Amnesty with Deportation 
Potential Illegal
Immigrant Population
PIIP
Actual Illegal
Immigrant Population
AIIPBorder Crossing
Rate BCR
Illegal Immigration
Contact Rate iicr
Total Population N
Border
Crossitivity bc
+
Depletion of PIIP
Increase in AIIP
+ Illegal Immigrant
Apprehension
Population IIAPApprehension
Rate AR
+
Depletion of AIIP
deportation rate
apprehension
percentage
deportation delay
Amnesty
Population AP
Amnesty rate
amnesty
percentage
border crossitivity
due to AP
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V. Findings 
The expectations for each Potential Actual Illegal Immigration (PAIIP) model 
case are articulated in this section.  Next, the validation process for the PAIIP model is 
presented.  Finally, the results from the validation are recorded and discussed.  The 
quantitative data and trends discussed in this section help provide a framework of support 
towards exploring solution(s) for border security and illegal immigration. 
V.1 Expectations 
The following expectations for the simulation results from the PAIIP model’s 
cases are derived from the causal loop diagrams (CLD 1 – 3) presented in this study. 
1. An increase in the value of the border crossivity policy lever should increase:  
a) the Potential Illegal Immigrant Population 
b) the entry of unauthorized immigrants (border crossing rate), and 
c) the Actual Illegal Immigrant Population  
2. A decrease in the value of the border crossivity policy lever should decrease:  
a) the Potential Illegal Immigrant Population 
b) the entry of unauthorized immigrants (border crossing rate), and 
c) the Actual Illegal Immigrant Population  
3. An increase in the value of the illegal immigration contact rate (iicr) should 
increase: 
a) the entry of unauthorized immigrants (border crossing rate), and 
b) the Actual Illegal Immigrant Population 
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4. A decrease in the value of the illegal immigration contact rate (iicr) should 
decrease:  
a) the entry of unauthorized immigrants (border crossing rate), and 
b)  the Actual Illegal Immigrant Population 
5. An increase in the apprehension percentage (Deportable Aliens Located By 
Border Patrol Sector) should decrease: 
a) the Actual Illegal Immigrant Population, and 
b) the entry of unauthorized immigrants (border crossing rate) 
6. An increase in the apprehension percentage (Deportable Aliens Located By 
Border Patrol Sector) should increase: 
a) detentions (Illegal Immigrant Apprehension Population) and, 
b) deportations (deportation rate) 
7. A decrease in the apprehension percentage  (Deportable Aliens Located By 
Border Patrol Sector) should increase: 
a) the entry of unauthorized immigrants (border crossing rate), and 
b) the Actual Illegal Immigrant Population 
8. An increase in the amnesty percentage should increase: 
a) the Amnesty Population (AP) and, 
b) the value of the border crossivity variable 
9. A decrease in the amnesty percentage should decrease: 
a) the Amnesty Population (AP) and, 
b) the value of the border crossivity variable 
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The expectations described in this section set up a framework for further 
discussion of the PAIIP model’s case results.  Moreover, comparing and contrasting the 
PAIIP model’s two cases in the following subsections will be extremely insightful 
because they incorporate past and present policies that have been used to regulate border 
security and illegal immigration. 
V.2 PAIIP Model Validation 
 The purpose of this section is to examine the behavior of both cases for the PAIIP 
model prior to providing its simulation results.  The data used to validate the PAIIP 
model’s behavior and results are theoretical.   
The following tables provide the theoretical data that was calculated and inputted into the 
PAIIP model’s Detention and Deportation case simulations: 
Parameters (Theoretical) Inputted for (All) Simulations 
PIIP AIIP IIAP    N 
99  1  Calculated by PAIIP Model 100 
 
Parameters (Theoretical) Inputted for (All) Simulations 
Border Crossing Rate Apprehension Rate   Deportation Rate  
Calculated by PAIIP Model   Calculated by PAIIP Model Calculated by PAIIP Model 
 
Simulation # IICR Border Crossivity Apprehension % Deportation Delay 
1  1  20%   35%   1 year 
2  2  40%   35%   2 years 
3  3  60%   35%   3 years 
4  4  80%   35%   4 years 
5  5  100%   35%   5 years 
 
 
 For the Detention and Deportation model, Simulation numbers (1 – 5) increased 
the iicr, border crossivity, and deportation delay policy levers.  The focus behind these 
five simulations was on the process of communication and contact between actual and 
potential illegal immigrants by simulating border crossings when the initial actual 
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population of illegal immigrants is 1, and the potential illegal immigration population is 
99.  The total population communicating with each other is 100.  
With border crossivity set at 20% and the iicr set to 1 for Simulation number 1 of 
the Detention and Deportation case, Chart 1 shows the results for the PIIP, AIIP, and 
IIAP; Chart 2 shows the results for the BCR, AR, and DR.  The changes in the PIIP, 
AIIP, and IIAP are very minute and are almost negligible because their value changes are 
on a decimal level.  These miniscule changes are reflective in the BCR, AR, and DR as 
well.  
Chart 1 
Detention and Deportation (Simulation #1): Various Populations Over Time
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Chart 2 
Detention and Deportation (Simulation #1): Various Rates Over Time
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Chart 3 and Chart 4 reveal the results when the border crossivity’s value was 
increased to 40% and the iicr was set to 2 for Simulation number 2.  Increasing the border 
crossivity and the iicr produced visible growth and changes in the various populations 
and rates for the Detention and Deportation case.  While the PIIP decreases, both the 
AIIP and IIAP increase.  The increase in communication and contact rate resulted in 
increases for the BCR, AR, and DR.   
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Chart 3 
Deportation with Detention (Simulation #2): Various Populations Over Time
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Chart 4 
 
Detention and Deportation (Simulation #2): Various Rates Over Time
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The border crossivity value was set to 60% and the iicr was increased to 3, for 
Simulation number 3, and the results are presented in Chart 5 and Chart 6.  The increased 
border crossivity and contact rate creates more dynamics in the PIIP, AIIP, and IIAP.  
First, there is a faster and sharper initial decrease in the PIIP from the years 2009 to 2015.   
Then, from 2015 to 2018, the PIIP increases, and from 2018 to 2021, the PIIP decreases.  
Between the years of 2009 and 2021, both the AIIP and IIAP exponentially 
increase for some time, then decrease, and slightly increase again.  The AIIP increases 
from the years of 2009 to 2013.75; then it decreases from 2014 to 2018.75 before slightly 
increasing again and leveling off from 2019 to 2021.  The IIAP increases from the years 
2009 to 2016, then it decreases from 2016.25 to 2019 before increasing again and 
leveling off between 2019.25 and 2021.  
Chart 5 
Detention and Deportation (Simulation #3): Various Populations Over Time
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Chart 6 also delineates how the increase in border crossivity and iicr in 
Simulation number 3 produced more activity in the BCR, AR, and DR.  Each rate 
overshoots and collapses until finally converging between a value of either 13 or 14 
people per year. Though the behavior of each rate is analogous, the largest initial increase 
is in the BCR.  For example, the border crossing rate increases from 2 people a year in 
2009 to over 30 people a year by 2012.    
Chart 6 
Detention and Deportation (Simulation #3): Various Rates Over Time
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Simulation number 4 increased the border crossivity and iicr to 80% and 4 people 
a year respectively.  The results from Simulation number 4 are illustrated in Chart 7 and 
Chart 8.  Simulation number 5 increases the border crossivity to 100%.  The border 
crossivity in Simulation number 5 was increased to 100%, and the iicr was increased to 5; 
Chart 9 and Chart 10 show the results.   
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Chart 7 
 
Detention and Deportation (Simulation #4): Various Populations Over Time
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Chart 8 
Detention and Deportation (Simulation #4) Various Rates Over Time
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Chart 9 
Detention and Deportation (Simulation #5): Various Populations Over Time
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Chart 10 
Detention and Deportation (Simulation #5) Deportation Rates Over Time
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The results from the Detention and Deportation simulation numbers (1 - 5) reveal 
that increasing both border crossivity and the iicr increases illegal border crossings.  
Increasing border crossivity results in a significant initial surge in illegal crossings.  
However, as illegal immigrants cross the border and are apprehended and deported the 
actual illegal immigration and apprehension population both increase and decrease over 
time.  The apprehended and deported aliens feed into the potential illegal immigrant 
population.  The potential illegal immigrant population is drained when there is a 
successful border crossing.  This entire process of activities and behaviors creates the 
various graphical results depicted in the simulation charts for the Detention and 
Deportation case.   
In continuation of the validation of the PAIIP model, the focus will now shift 
towards the Detention and Deportation with Amnesty case.  For the Detention and 
Deportation with Amnesty model, Simulation numbers (1 – 5) increase the iicr, border 
crossivity, deportation delay, and amnesty policy levers, while the apprehension rate 
remains constant.   The purpose behind these five simulations is to examine the process 
of communication and contact between actual and potential illegal immigrants by 
simulating border crossings, when the initial actual population of illegal immigrants is 1 
and the potential illegal immigration population is 99, and to examine how the additional 
policy of amnesty in this case impacts communication and contact.  The total population 
communicating with each other is 100. 
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The results for the Detention and Deportation with Amnesty case are recorded in 
Charts 11-20; and the data collected will be compared to the results of the Deportation 
with Detention case, specifically Charts (1 – 10) in this section.  The same data used for 
the base case was inputted into this case to examine the impact of adding an amnesty rate 
and amnesty population stock.  
In comparing Simulation number 1 for both cases, Chart 1 and Chart 11 exhibit 
the same behavior; both charts show little to no change in their respective populations.  
Also, for Simulation number 1, Chart 2 and Chart 12 demonstrate how the respective 
rates for each case show very minute changes in value.  As the border crossivity and iicr 
are increased, the dynamics of the second case’s results initially change, but the majority 
of data graphed behave similarly to the base case’s results.  For example, although the 
potential illegal immigrant population in Chart 13 decreases over time, the amnesty 
population exponentially increases in Chart 13.  The increase in the amnesty population 
over time causes a slower growth in the actual illegal immigrant and illegal immigrant 
apprehension populations.  As depicted in Chart 14, every rate exponentially increases, 
reaches a maximum, and then begins to decrease. 
The remaining Charts (15 – 20) all show that an increase in border crossivity and 
the iicr for the PAIIP model’s second case causes an exponential increase in the amnesty 
population.  In addition, in Charts (15, 17, and 19), the potential illegal immigrant 
population exponentially decreases and afterwards increases before leveling off.   
Moreover, as illegal immigrants are apprehended and deported, the actual and illegal 
immigrant apprehension populations overshoot and collapse for Charts (15, 17, and 19).  
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Finally, the border crossing, apprehension, deportation, and amnesty rates for Charts (16, 
18, and 20), all overshoot and collapse. 
The results from the second case reveal a flaw in the PAIIP model.  For instance, 
in Simulation number 5, the total population is 100 (Actual Illegal immigrants = 1, and 
Potential Illegal Immigrants = 99) and the various stocks throughout the model are 
drained by different rates; Chart 20 demonstrates how the border crossing rate decreases 
below zero to negative values.  This behavior indicates that the PAIIP model is not 
perfect.  Thus, the user must be conscious about the data inputted into the model, 
especially small population values for the PIIP and AIIP as the border crossivity and iicr 
are increased.   
The following tables provide the theoretical data that was calculated and inputted into the 
PAIIP model’s Detention and Deportation with Amnesty case simulations: 
 
Parameters (Theoretical) Inputted for (All) Simulations 
PIIP AIIP IIAP    N    
99  1 Calculated by PAIIP Model 100 
 
Parameters (Theoretical) Inputted for (All) Simulations 
AP Border Crossing Rate  Apprehension Rate     
0 Calculated by PAIIP Model   Calculated by PAIIP Model  
 
Parameters (Theoretical) Inputted for (All) Simulations 
Amnesty Rate    Deportation Rate  Apprehension %  
Calculated by PAIIP Model   Calculated by PAIIP Model 35% 
 
Simulation # IICR Border Crossivity Amnesty Percentage Deportation Delay 
1 1  20%   20%   1 year 
2 2  40%   40%   2 years 
3 3  60%   60%   3 years 
4 4  80%   80%   4 years 
5 5  100%   100%   5 years 
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Chart 11 
Detention and Deportation with Amnesty (Simulation #1): Various Populations Over Time
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Chart 12 
Detention and Deportation with Amnesty (Simulation #1): Various Rates Over Time
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Chart 13 
 
Detention and Deportation with Amnesty (Simulation #2): Various Populations Over Time
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Chart 14 
 
Detention and Deportation with Amnesty (Simulation #2): Various Rates Over Time
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Chart 15 
 
Detention and Deportation with Amensty (Simulation #3): Various Populations Over Time
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Chart 16 
 
Detention and Deportation with Amnesty (Simulation #3): Various Rates Over Time
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Chart 17 
Detention and Deportation with Amnesty (Simulation #4): Various Populations Over Time
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Chart 18 
 
Detention and Deportation with Amnesty (Simulation #4): Various Rates Over Time
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Chart 19 
Detention and Deportation with Amnesty (Simulation #5): Various Populations Over Time
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Chart 20 
 
Detention and Deportation with Amnesty (Simulation #5): Various Rates Over Time
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VI. Discussion 
The research in this study encompasses the utilization of systems modeling to 
examine and aid towards solving some of the problems of border security and illegal 
immigration.  Therefore, the context of the discussion will show the success of the PAIIP 
model, elaborate on the dynamics and implications of the PAIIP model’s results, and 
answer the questions raised in the research questions section.  In doing so, the foundation 
from the discussion section on the PAIIP Model will be used to make policy 
recommendation(s).   
VI.1 Results 
 The results from the Detention and Deportation and Detention and Deportation 
with Amnesty cases will be elaborated upon even further.  The purpose of this section is 
to ascertain how the policies of detention and deportation and amnesty impact the 
communication between potential and actual illegal immigrants.      
VI.1.1 Detention and Deportation 
Fifty simulations were run for the Deportation with Detention case.  For each 
respective illegal immigration contact rate (1-5), the border crossivity and apprehension 
percentages were incrementally increased by 10%, while the deportation delay was kept 
constant at one year.  Hence, more theoretical data was inputted into the PAIIP model to 
examine and discuss the impact of detention and deportation on a larger total population 
of 60 million potential and actual illegal immigrants communicating with each other.   
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The charts in this section display the results for each variable in this case, when 
the border crossivity variable was set to 10% and 100% respectively.  Charts (1 – 6) 
provide the results on communication between potential and actual illegal immigrants 
when the border crossivity is 10%.  Charts (7-12) demonstrate the results when the border 
crossivity is 100%.  The remaining charts for the base case are located in Appendix B.   
Charts (1-3) and Charts (7-9) present the results for the various population 
variables from the Detention and Deportation case.  Chart 1 and Chart 7 show the growth 
in the potential illegal immigrant population.  As the iicr was increased from (1 -5) 
people a year, the overall potential illegal immigrant population decreased for Chart 1 
and Chart 7 for each respective contact rate.  Since the border crossivity is ten times 
higher for Chart 7’s results than Chart 1’s, the potential illegal immigrant populations are 
greater for Chart 7.  Moreover, Chart 1’s trends for its various potential illegal immigrant 
populations steadily decrease faster than Chart 7’s.  Though the potential illegal 
immigrant population decreases in Chart 7, the high level of communication causes the 
growth for each population and respective contact rate to level off.   
Chart 2 and Chart 8 show the growth in the actual illegal immigrant population.  
The actual illegal immigrant population increased for each respective contact rate for 
both charts.  Even though the overall actual illegal immigrant population increased for 
both charts, Chart 8’s trends in growth for its populations vary from Chart 2.  For 
instance, while Chart 2 shows exponential growth for each actual illegal immigrant 
population, Chart 8’s results yield more dynamic growth patterns such as overshooting 
and collapsing.  The difference in Chart 2 and Chart 8’s behavior is attributed to the value 
of the apprehension percentage(s) for the results in both charts.  Chart 2’s apprehension 
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percentage is 10%, while Chart 8’s apprehension percentage is a maximum value of 
100%.  The higher the apprehension percentage the faster the actual illegal immigrant 
population is drained across each respective contact rate.      
 Chart 3 and Chart 9 show the behavior of the illegal immigrant population.  The 
illegal immigrant apprehension population increased for the respective contact rate for 
both charts.  Although both charts display an increase in the overall illegal immigrant 
apprehension population, Chart 9 displays higher values and more dynamics in its growth 
trends for apprehended illegal immigrants than Chart 3.  While Chart 3 demonstrates 
linear and exponential growth, Chart 9’s trends in growth exponentially decrease, 
increase, or overshoot and collapse.  Chart 9’s trends are attributed to the maximum 
apprehension percentage of 100% and the combined deportation rate and deportation 
delay of one year.  Thus, as apprehensions feed into the illegal immigrant apprehension 
population, at the same time it is also drained by the deportation rate.   
Charts (4-6) and Charts (10-12) show the results for the various rates in the base 
case.  Chart 4 and Chart 10 show the growth in the border crossing rate.  As the iicr was 
increased from (1-5) people a year, the overall border crossing rate increased for Chart 4 
and Chart 10.   When the iicr was set to 1 the border crossing rates for Chart 4 and Chart 
10 decreased; Chart 4’s decrease was linear, while Chart 10’s was exponential.  Chart 4’s 
trends produced linear growth when the iicr was set to 2 and exponential growth when 
the iicr was set to 3; iicr values of 4 and 5 produced trends that overshot and collapsed.   
Chart 10’s border crossing rate trend overshot and collapsed when the iicr was set to 2; 
iicr values of 3, 4, and 5 resulted in oscillation.   
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The overall behavior for the border crossing rates in Chart 10 varies from Chart 4 
and is more dynamic because the border crossivity was greater in value.  In addition, 
since the potential and actual illegal immigrant populations increased due to successful 
illegal border crossings and decreased from apprehensions and deportations, the total 
population of communication fluctuated as well.  Thus, as the iicr increased, the growth 
trends in the border crossing rate displayed greater variation. 
Chart 5 and Chart 11 show the growth in the apprehension rate.  Except for the 
decreasing trend when the iicr was set to 1 for Chart 5 and Chart 11, the overall 
apprehension rate for the remaining contact rate values increased for both charts.  
However, Chart 5’s trends in growth for its apprehension rate vary from Chart 11.  For 
instance, while Chart 5 shows linear and exponential growth in the apprehension rate for 
iicr values ranging from 2 to 5, Chart 8’s results yield more dynamic growth patterns, 
especially oscillation.  The difference in Chart 5 and Chart 11’s behavior is attributed to 
the apprehension percentages of 10% and 100% respectively, as well as the discrepancy 
in growth for their actual illegal immigrant population(s).   
Chart 6 and Chart 12 show the behavior of the deportation rate.  The overall 
deportation rate for each respective contact rate value increases for Chart 6 and Chart 12, 
except for the decreasing trend when the iicr was set to 1 for both charts.  While Chart 
12’s results yield more dynamic growth patterns such as overshooting and collapsing and 
oscillation, Chart 5 shows linear and exponential growth in the deportation rate.  These 
differences are due to the variation in growth for their illegal immigrant apprehension 
populations, and the respective apprehension percentage values of 10% and 100%.  
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The following tables provide the theoretical data that was calculated and inputted into the 
PAIIP model’s Detention and Deportation case simulations: 
Parameters (Theoretical) Inputted for (All) Simulations 
PIIP  AIIP  IIAP    N 
50 million 10 million Calculated by PAIIP Model 60 million 
 
Parameters (Theoretical) Inputted for (All) Simulations 
Border Crossing Rate  Apprehension Rate   Deportation Rate  
Calculated by PAIIP Model   Calculated by PAIIP Model Calculated by PAIIP Model 
 
Simulation # IICR Border Crossivity Apprehension % Deportation Delay 
1 1  10%   10%   1 year 
2 1  20%   20%   1 year 
3 1  30%   30%   1 year 
4 1  40%   40%   1 year 
5 1  50%   50%   1 year 
6 1  60%   60%   1 year 
7 1  70%   70%   1 year 
8 1  80%   80%   1 year 
9 1  90%   90%   1 year 
10 1  100%   100%   1 year 
 
Simulation # IICR Border Crossivity Apprehension % Deportation Delay 
11 2  10%   10%   1 year 
12 2  20%   20%   1 year 
13 2  30%   30%   1 year 
14 2  40%   40%   1 year 
15 2  50%   50%   1 year 
16 2  60%   60%   1 year 
17 2  70%   70%   1 year 
18 2  80%   80%   1 year 
19 2  90%   90%   1 year 
20 2  100%   100%   1 year 
 
Simulation # IICR Border Crossivity Apprehension % Deportation Delay 
21 3  10%   10%   1 year 
22 3  20%   20%   1 year 
23 3  30%   30%   1 year 
24 3  40%   40%   1 year 
25 3  50%   50%   1 year 
26 3  60%   60%   1 year 
27 3  70%   70%   1 year 
28 3  80%   80%   1 year 
29 3  90%   90%   1 year 
30 3  100%   100%   1 year 
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Simulation # IICR Border Crossivity Apprehension % Deportation Delay 
31 4  10%   10%   1 year 
32 4  20%   20%   1 year 
33 4  30%   30%   1 year 
34 4  40%   40%   1 year 
35 4  50%   50%   1 year 
36 4  60%   60%   1 year 
37 4  70%   70%   1 year 
38 4  80%   80%   1 year 
39 4  90%   90%   1 year 
40 4  100%   100%   1 year 
 
Simulation # IICR Border Crossivity Apprehension % Deportation Delay 
41 5  10%   10%   1 year 
42 5  20%   20%   1 year 
43 5  30%   30%   1 year 
44 5  40%   40%   1 year 
45 5  50%   50%   1 year 
46 5  60%   60%   1 year 
47 5  70%   70%   1 year 
48 5  80%   80%   1 year 
49 5  90%   90%   1 year 
50 5  100%   100%   1 year 
 
Chart 1 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (1, 11, 21, 31, & 41) 
Potential Illegal Immigrant Population Over Time
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Chart 2 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (1, 11, 21, 31, & 41)
Actual Illegal Immigration Population Over Time
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Chart 3 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (1, 11, 21, 31, & 41)
Illegal Immigrant Apprehension Population Over Time
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Chart 4 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (1, 11, 21, 31, & 41)
Border Crossing Rate Over Time
0
1,000,000
2,000,000
3,000,000
4,000,000
5,000,000
6,000,000
7,000,000
8,000,000
20
09
.
00
20
09
.
75
20
10
.
50
20
11
.
25
20
12
.
00
20
12
.
75
20
13
.
50
20
14
.
25
20
15
.
00
20
15
.
75
20
16
.
50
20
17
.
25
20
18
.
00
20
18
.
75
20
19
.
50
20
20
.
25
20
21
.
00
Year
Po
pu
la
tio
n Border Crossing Rate for iicr = 1
Border Crossing Rate for iicr = 2
Border Crossing Rate for iicr = 3
Border Crossing Rate for iicr = 4
Border Crossing Rate for iicr = 5
 
 
Chart 5 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (1, 11, 21, 31, & 41)
Apprehension Rate Over Time
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Chart 6 
 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (1, 11, 21, 31, & 41)
Deportation Rate Over Time 
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Chart 7 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (10, 20, 30, 40, & 50)
Potential Illegal Immigration Population Over Time
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Chart 8 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (10, 20, 30, 40, & 50)
Actual Illegal Immigrant Population Over Time
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Chart 9 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (10, 20, 30, 40, & 50)
 Illegal Immigrant Apprehension Population Over Time
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Chart 10 
 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (10, 20, 30, 40, & 50)
Border Crossing Rate Over Time
0
10,000,000
20,000,000
30,000,000
40,000,000
50,000,000
60,000,000
70,000,000
20
09
.
00
20
09
.
75
20
10
.
50
20
11
.
25
20
12
.
00
20
12
.
75
20
13
.
50
20
14
.
25
20
15
.
00
20
15
.
75
20
16
.
50
20
17
.
25
20
18
.
00
20
18
.
75
20
19
.
50
20
20
.
25
20
21
.
00
Year
Po
pu
la
tio
n
Border Crossing Rate for iicr = 1
Border Crossing Rate for iicr = 2
Border Crossing Rate for iicr = 3
Border Crossing Rate for iicr = 4
Border Crossing Rate for iicr = 5
 
 
Chart 11 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (10, 20, 30, 40, & 50)
Apprehension Rate Over Time
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Chart 12 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (10, 20, 30, 40, & 50)
Deportation Rate Over Time
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VI.1.2 Detention and Deportation with Amnesty 
Fifty simulations were also run for the Detention and Deportation with Amnesty 
case in this section.  For each respective illegal immigration contact rate (1-5), the border 
crossivity, amnesty, and apprehension percentage were incrementally increased by 10%, 
while the deportation delay was kept constant at 1 year.  Hence, more theoretical data 
was inputted to examine and discuss the impact of amnesty and detention and deportation 
on a total population of 60 million potential and actual illegal immigrants communicating 
with each other.   
The charts in this section display the results for each variable in this case when 
the border crossivity variable was set to 10% and 100% respectively.  Charts (13 – 20) 
provide the results on communication between potential and actual illegal immigrants 
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when the border crossivity is 10%.  Charts (21-28) display the results when the border 
crossivity is 100%.  The remaining charts for the base case are located in Appendix C.   
The results of the Detention and Deportation case are very analogous to the 
Detention and Deportation with Amnesty case.  In addition, comparing the behavior of 
the second case to the base case yielded the same types of trends and results.  In short, 
increasing border crossivity and the iicr resulted in more total illegal crossings and 
growth in the actual illegal immigrant population, and the increase in the amnesty and 
apprehension percentages produced increasing or decreasing exponential trends and 
oscillation.   
A key observation in this case is that even with a policy of deportation the PIIP 
still exponentially decreases.  The PIIP decreases because the AIIP is drained by the 
amnesty, apprehension, and deportation rates.  Since the PAIIP model is based on 
feedback, anytime the AIIP begins to exponentially decrease, the ability for 
communication between actual and potential illegal immigrants decreases.   
The overall increase in the border crossing rate for Case #2 is attributed to the 
assumption behind its design, specifically the border crossivity due to AP parameter.  The 
border crossivity due to AP parameter increases the border crossivity variable and 
produces more illegal border crossings.  Therefore, the PAIIP model can not be used to 
make the argument that a policy of amnesty increases illegal border crossings.  However, 
the PAIIP model does show that granting amnesty theoretically causes an exponential 
increase in the amnesty population.   
One reason that supports the theoretical exponential growth of the amnesty 
population is that legalization enables immigrants to sponsor their family members 
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(Rytina, 2002, p. 5).  In short, if an immigrant becomes legal through amnesty, they are 
entitled to bring over a loved one because it is the law.  Furthermore, the trends from the 
total amnesty rate and total amnesty population support the argument that there are 
indirect effects of legalization programs, specifically amnestied immigrants utilizing 
chain migration to either legally or illegally bring over their family members and loved 
ones into the United States (Rytina, 2002).  
The following tables provide the theoretical data that was calculated and inputted into the 
PAIIP model’s Detention and Deportation with Amnesty case simulations: 
 
Parameters (Theoretical) Inputted for (All) Simulations 
PIIP  AIIP  IIAP     
50 million 10 million Calculated by PAIIP Model  
 
Parameters (Theoretical) Inputted for (All) Simulations 
AP  N  Deportation Delay 
0  60 million 1 year 
 
Parameters (Theoretical) Inputted for (All) Simulations 
Border Crossing Rate  Apprehension Rate     
Calculated by PAIIP Model   Calculated by PAIIP Model  
 
Parameters (Theoretical) Inputted for (All) Simulations 
Amnesty Rate    Deportation Rate  
Calculated by PAIIP Model   Calculated by PAIIP Model  
 
 
Simulation # IICR Border Crossivity Apprehension % Amnesty Percentage 
1 1  10%   10%   10% 
2 1  20%   20%   20% 
3 1  30%   30%   40% 
4 1  40%   40%   40% 
5 1  50%   50%   50% 
6 1  60%   60%   60% 
7 1  70%   70%   70% 
8 1  80%   80%   80% 
9 1  90%   90%   90% 
 10 1  100%   100%   100% 
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Simulation # IICR Border Crossivity Apprehension % Amnesty Percentage 
11 2  10%   10%   10% 
12 2  20%   20%   20% 
13 2  30%   30%   40% 
14 2  40%   40%   40% 
15 2  50%   50%   50% 
16 2  60%   60%   60% 
17 2  70%   70%   70% 
18 2  80%   80%   80% 
19 2  90%   90%   90% 
 20 2  100%   100%   100% 
Simulation # IICR Border Crossivity Apprehension % Amnesty Percentage 
21 3  10%   10%   10% 
22 3  20%   20%   20% 
23 3  30%   30%   40% 
24 3  40%   40%   40% 
25 3  50%   50%   50% 
26 3  60%   60%   60% 
27 3  70%   70%   70% 
28 3  80%   80%   80% 
29 3  90%   90%   90% 
 30 3  100%   100%   100% 
Simulation # IICR Border Crossivity Apprehension % Amnesty Percentage 
31 4  10%   10%   10% 
32 4  20%   20%   20% 
33 4  30%   30%   40% 
34 4  40%   40%   40% 
35 4  50%   50%   50% 
36 4  60%   60%   60% 
37 4  70%   70%   70% 
38 4  80%   80%   80% 
39 4  90%   90%   90% 
 40 4  100%   100%   100% 
Simulation # IICR Border Crossivity Apprehension % Amnesty Percentage 
41 5  10%   10%   10% 
42 5  20%   20%   20% 
43 5  30%   30%   40% 
44 5  40%   40%   40% 
45 5  50%   50%   50% 
46 5  60%   60%   60% 
47 5  70%   70%   70% 
48 5  80%   80%   80% 
49 5  90%   90%   90% 
 50 5  100%   100%   100% 
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Chart 13 
Detention and Deportation with Amnesty: Simulation #'s (1, 11, 21, 31, & 41) 
Potential Illegal Immigrant Population Over Time
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Chart 14 
Deportation and Detention with Amnesty: Simulation #'s (1, 11, 21, 31, & 41) 
Actual Illegal Immigrant Population Over Time
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Chart 15 
Detention and Deportation with Amnesty: Simulation #'s (1, 11, 21, 31, & 41) 
Amnesty Population Over Time
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Chart 16 
Detention and Deportation with Amnesty: Simulation #'s (1, 11, 21, 31, & 41)  
Illegal Immigrant Apprehension Population Over Time
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Chart 17 
Detention and Deportation with Amnesty: Simulation #'s (1, 11, 21, 31, & 41)  
Border Crossing Rate Over Time
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Chart 18 
Detention and Deportation with Amnesty: Simulation #'s (1, 11, 21, 31, & 41)
Apprehension Rate Over Time
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Chart 19 
Detention and Deportation with Amnesty: Simulation #'s (1, 11, 21, 31, & 41) 
Amnesty Rate Over Time
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Chart 20 
Detention and Deportation with Amnesty: Simulation #'s (1, 11, 21, 31, & 41)
Deportation Rate Over Time
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Chart 21 
Detention and Deportation with Amnesty: Simulation #'s (10, 20, 30, 40, & 50) 
Potential Illegal Immigrant Population Over Time
0
10,000,000
20,000,000
30,000,000
40,000,000
50,000,000
60,000,000
20
09
.
00
20
09
.
50
20
10
.
00
20
10
.
50
20
11
.
00
20
11
.
50
20
12
.
00
20
12
.
50
20
13
.
00
20
13
.
50
20
14
.
00
20
14
.
50
20
15
.
00
20
15
.
50
20
16
.
00
20
16
.
50
20
17
.
00
20
17
.
50
20
18
.
00
20
18
.
50
20
19
.
00
20
19
.
50
20
20
.
00
20
20
.
50
20
21
.
00
Year
Po
pu
la
tio
n
PIIP for iicr = 1
PIIP for iicr = 2
PIIP for iicr = 3
PIIP for iicr = 4
PIIP for iicr = 5
 
 
Chart 22 
Detention and Deportation with Amnesty: Simulation #'s (10, 20, 30, 40, & 50) 
Actual Illegal Immigrant Population Over Time
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Chart 23 
Detention and Deportation with Amnesty: Simulation #'s (10, 20, 30, 40, & 50)
Amnesty Population Over Time 
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Chart 24 
Detention and Deportation with Amnesty: Simulation #'s (10, 20, 30, 40, & 50)
Illegal Immigrant Apprehension Population Over Time
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Chart 25 
Dentention and Deportation with Amnesty: Simulation #'s (10, 20, 30, 40, 50)
 Border Crossing Rate Over Time
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Chart 26 
Detention and Deportation with Amnesty: Simulation #'s (10, 20, 30, 40, 50) 
Apprehension Rate Over Time
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Chart 27 
 
Detention and Deportation with Amnesty: Simulation #'s (10, 20, 30, 40, 50)
Amnesty Rate Over Time
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Chart 28 
Detention and Deportation with Amnesty: Simulation #'s (10, 20, 30, 40, & 50) 
Deportation Rate Over Time
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VI.1.3 PAIIP Model Results vs Research Questions 
The PAIIP model was developed to test the ability of deportation, amnesty, and 
detention to decrease illegal immigration, and the results from the PAIIP model are 
comparable to the research questions of this study. 
The first research question was:   
1. Which policy or combination of policies has the best chance of limiting 
illegal migration?  
The PAIIP model’s design and results are based on the theory of communication 
between actual and potential illegal immigrants.  With over 100 simulation results, both 
cases for the PAIIP model reveal that an increase in the content of information (border 
crossvity) and the ability for an actual illegal immigrant to communicate reliable 
information to as many as five immigrants (iicr) who reside outside of the United States 
may be countered by improving border security measures (apprehension percentage).  
Improving the capacity to locate and apprehend illegal immigrants ultimately decreases 
growth in the actual illegal immigrant population.  Although apprehension and detention 
and deportation in both cases reduce the population of illegal immigrants in the United 
States, and the policy of amnesty helps bring actual illegal immigrants out of hiding, the 
ability to totally eradicate communication between people on any scale through public 
policy is very arduous and practically unfeasible.   
The literature review does provide some insight towards supporting the argument 
of the inability to implement polices that are able to effectively combat communication 
between potential and actual illegal immigrants.  For instance, every year at least one 
million deportable aliens are located by the border patrol.  Each night at least 27,500 
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illegal immigrants are held in detention.  However, there still exist political, economic, 
and social factors that motivate illegal border crossings of which chain migration is a 
result.  For example, Abraham et al. (2006), argue that many illegal migrants seek jobs 
with pay that would otherwise be unattainable in their native countries.  In addition, as 
articulated by Wegge (1998) and Edwards (2006), chain migration increases the ability 
for Mexicans and people other than Mexicans (OTMs) to enter the United States because 
their networks of knowledge and communication between potential and actual migrants, 
and human smugglers assist towards illegal immigration.  Therefore, the various 
motivations of potential immigrants, chain migration, and population growth help explain 
why the policies of detention and deportation and amnesty do not completely eradicate 
border crossings.  
2. What does Border Security need to be successful at executing their 
agenda and goals?  
In reference to the PAIIP model’s results, as illegal immigrants are apprehended, 
detained, and deported, they are returned back into the potential illegal immigrant 
population.  When an illegal immigrant is deported back home, he or she may 
communicate with a friend or relative and share his or her new knowledge and 
experiences about the United States; this has the strong probability of stimulating the 
desire for an illegal border cross.  However, the fact that the immigrant, who may be a 
friend or relative of the person they are sharing this information with, was forcibly 
apprehended and deported, should raise a sense of risk and weaken the willingness of 
both parties to attempt illegal entry into the United States.   
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Since the policy of deportation puts immigrants back into the potential illegal 
immigrant pool, the biometric technologies such as fingerprint, facial, and iris technology 
are essential for border security (Kingsbury, 2003, p. 4).  These procedures are already 
being implemented into the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) 
activities.  In addition, the consideration of Congress to fund UAVs and RPVs, as 
technological tools to assist border patrols is also a legitimate investment decision 
(Blazakis, 2004, p. 3).   
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The exponential increase in government spending on the border patrol makes 
sense because an increase in border patrol funding, coupled with the latest technological 
innovations should help towards reducing illegal border crossings and deterring illegal 
immigrants who attempt to re-enter the United States once they have been deported.  
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Therefore, ensuring that illegal immigrants who desire to enter the country are stopped 
requires a strong and organized ICE, CBP, and National Border Patrol Strategy. 
VII. Policy Recommendations 
Border security and illegal immigration are important public policy issues that 
require careful decision making by political actors. Assuming the validity of the chain 
migration theory and other assumptions incorporated into the PAIIP model, we find that 
no single or combination of policies will solve this problem.  The policy 
recommendations outlined below focus on the economic and national security aspects of 
border security and illegal immigration.  Overall, the PAIIP model was better at 
examining the deterrence of illegal immigration than dealing with the national security 
piece or, more specifically, preventing terrorism.  .     
VII.1. The United States government should expand its temporary work 
card program instead of granting amnesty. 
One policy remedy that may curtail illegal border crossings and border security 
spending is the expansion of the temporary work card program, specifically increasing 
the number of temporary work cards.  The hypothesis in this research study focuses on 
the argument of communication between potential and actual illegal immigrants.  
Therefore, this research study acknowledges how a policy to allow more immigrants to 
enter legally and become temporarily employed automatically provides them with the 
opportunity to share their experiences and knowledge.  
The most recent census data reports that one out of every ten people born in 
Mexico currently live in the United States.  If, for instance, more Mexicans were given 
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temporary work cards, there would be no real legitimate restriction on their ability to 
communicate with family and friends across the border.  If OTMs are given more 
temporary work cards, they could communicate across the globe as well.  Thus, this 
research study also recognizes that granting more temporary work cards runs counter to 
its hypothesis, because it would potentially increase border crossivity and stimulate more 
illegal crossings.  However, there are strengths and benefits of a larger temporary work 
program combined with solid oversight and enforcement. 
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The increase in temporary work cards may help towards reducing some of the 
costs incurred from border security spending.  For instance, Massey (2005) reports that it 
costs the Border Patrol approximately $1,700 to apprehend an illegal immigrant.  
Kolodner (2006) reports that it costs $95 a night to detain an illegal immigrant.  Simcox 
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(1997) reported that ten years after the implementation of the IRCA of 1986, an estimated 
$102.1 billion was spent.  Furthermore, the amount of money spent on Border Patrol 
continues to exponentially increase despite the fact that nearly 500,000 illegal immigrants 
a year are able to penetrate the borders of the United States and become part of the 
millions of illegal immigrants that already reside in America today.   
  Presently, the United States annually allocates only 5,000 employment-based 
green cards for workers in less-skilled jobs and 66,000 temporary work cards a year in 
less-skilled jobs besides agriculture.  In reference to worker movement, the social 
networks between Mexicans residing in Mexico and the United States, coupled with the 
integration of economic growth in various sectors, has made the process of sealing the 
border very arduous and a failed policy initiative (Massey, 2005, p. 5).  For a small 
application fee, which many migrant workers would be willing to pay, Massey (2005) 
recommends that the United States should expand the temporary worker program that 
enables the applicant to enter, live, and work for two years without constraints.  Despite 
the fact that workers with temporary work cards will not have the opportunity for 
naturalization or the ability to legally bring over their relatives or friends, at least they 
have a medium for employment and the opportunity to earn a legal income.  Therefore, 
the federal government should increase the amount of temporary work cards granted to 
Mexicans and OTMS.  
Finally, in reference to the PAIIP model’s cases, not only do their results reflect 
some of the challenges in trying to find a solution to border security and illegal 
immigration, but also the notion that the responsibility of the United States government is 
to ensure that their decisions on this public policy issue do not conflict with one another.  
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Moreover, the literature review and PAIIP model results indicate that future public 
policies should enable agencies such as ICE and CBP to effectively perform their jobs 
and achieve their respective goals.  Therefore, the ability for border security to 
thoroughly execute their objectives is based on immigration policies and solutions that 
incorporate the cooperation of the government at the local, state, and national level. 
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VIII. Conclusion 
The challenge of providing border security and deterring illegal immigration 
requires sound and prudent public policy.  Thus, the PAIIP model was developed with the 
recognition that an illegal border crossing by immigrants into the United States is a 
serious public policy problem.  The research in this study was primarily done by using 
secondary data analysis and incorporated systems modeling.  In addition, since the PAIIP 
model is a deductive systems model based on theory, only hypothetical data was entered 
into the model to produce its results.  Therefore, this study has limitations.     
For example, neither real potential nor actual illegal immigrants were interviewed 
by the researcher for data collection and analysis because there was not enough time, 
capital, or resources to execute such a feat.  Moreover, income, wages, and the overall 
economy of the United States were not programmed into the design of the PAIIP model.  
Therefore, the impact of economic issues on the attempt or desire for one to illegally 
enter the United States was not measured or analyzed in this study.  If these various types 
of information were included in this research, it would have provided more depth to the 
study.   
Like the overall methodology in this research, the PAIIP model’s design also has 
weaknesses and is not perfect.  For example, the PAIIP model’s cases do not take into 
account the dynamics of population growth and death.  While the PIIP stock has no 
growth rate, the amnesty population stock does not have a death rate.  Since the amnesty 
population stock has no death rate, the PAIIP model produces rapid exponential growth 
for this population.    
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No model is perfect, but it is possible that some of the flaws in the PAIIP model 
may be fixed to improve its analytic and illustrative capabilities.   For example, the PAIIP 
model may be modified by incorporating the factors of population growth and economic 
indicators in its PIIP stock and a death rate for the amnesty population stock.  Another 
alternative to the problem with the amnesty population stock would be to eradicate it 
completely from the entire model but still keep the amnesty rate and amnesty percentage 
variables.  Systems modeling enables population growth analysis.  Therefore, the 
numbers from the amnesty rate(s) may be entered into advanced population growth 
models to better understand their growth and behavior.  The inability to design a better 
research methodology did not inhibit the capacity of this study to provide insight towards 
solving the problem of border security and illegal immigration.   
That the driving theory behind the design of the PAIIP model is communication 
between actual illegal immigrants residing in the United States and potential illegal 
immigrants outside of America, the literature review supports the dynamic hypothesis of 
the PAIIP model by discussing the impact of chain migration, human smuggling, and the 
desire of illegal immigrants to find work.  Since the PAIIP model tests the policies of 
detention and deportation and amnesty, the context behind these three strategies and 
policies was elaborated on, including the enforcement agencies that combat illegal 
immigration and terrorism such as ICE and CBP, as well as President Obama’s 
immigration reform agenda, which is not firmly fixed at this point.  
Also critical to the design and comprehension of the PAIIP model, was the linear 
regression approach.  This technique was used to compare and contrast the exponential 
increase in border security spending versus the actual amount of deportable aliens located 
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by the border patrol.  The linear regression analysis results revealed that the increase in 
border patrol spending does not correlate with an increase in illegal immigrants 
apprehended.   Therefore, casual loop diagrams, CLD (1-3), were constructed to map out 
some of the political, economic, and social factors that stimulate illegal entry and 
encompass border security issues, specifically the inability of border patrol to apprehend 
immigrants who are able to successfully to enter the United States illegally. 
The literature review was not the only element of support for the theory and 
design of the PAIIP model.  Although the “validation and verification of models is 
impossible,” it does not eradicate the need for proof that a systems model works 
(Sterman, 2000, p. 846).  In order to prove the functionality of the PAIIP model, the same 
initial values for each stock and rate were inputted into both of its cases2.  Each case 
started with a total population of 100 actual and potential illegal immigrants 
communicating each other (AIIP = 1, PIIP =99).  The results from the initial ten 
simulations revealed that increasing border crossivity and the illegal immigrant contact 
rate increase illegal crossings and the actual illegal immigrant population.  However, the 
greater the value of the apprehension percentage resulted in an increase in the amount of 
detentions and deportations; it also decreased the total population of actual illegal 
immigrants.  The amnesty percentage decreased the actual illegal immigrant population 
as well.    
The PAIIP model’s results were found to be comparable with the two research 
questions developed from the literature review of this study.  Therefore, the policy 
recommendation(s) of an expanded temporary work program advocated in this study 
should be adhered to for several reasons.  First, it is estimated that 9 to 10 million 
                                                 
2
 Please refer to the Validation section to see the theoretical data that was inputted into the model. 
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undocumented immigrants reside in the United States.  Second, the yearly cost to detain 
illegal immigrants is approximately $1 billion.  Third, although amnesty is a policy 
remedy, it has many opponents.  For instance, Edwards and Hanson argue that the policy 
of amnesty through chain migration increases illegal immigration.  In addition, the policy 
of amnesty is irrelevant at preventing terrorism, and the effectiveness of deportation and 
detention are both useless ploys if a terrorist has already been residing in America.  
Furthermore, not only do the opponents of amnesty outnumber the supporters, as Rytina 
warns, but policymakers have to be cognizant of the adverse affects of legalization.  
Thus, an alternative to amnesty, and potential effective reducer of illegal crossings and 
cost for border security, is the allocation of more temporary work cards. 
 The research in this study reveals that there is no one viable solution for border 
security and illegal immigration.  As the PAIIP model evolves in its development and 
more immigration research is done, the methodology of using systems modeling and 
applying it to the challenges of border security and illegal immigration will enable public 
policy officials to create and enforce better immigration policies and regulations.  In 
doing so, policy actors will be able to ensure that there is uniformity and consistency in 
the policies that tackle border security and illegal immigration and ultimately provide the 
best national security possible, all the while assuring the continual prosperity of the 
United States of America.  
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IX. Appendix 
IX.1 A 
Table 1 
 
Southwest Sector  Other Sectors 
San Diego, CA  Blaine, WA 
 El Centro, CA . Buffalo, NY 
 Yuma, AZ Detroit, MI 
Tucson, AZ  Grand Forks, ND 
 El Paso, TX Havre, MT 
 Marfa, TX  Houlton, ME 
 Del Rio, TX  Livermore, CA 
 Laredo, TX Miami, FL 
 Rio Grande Valley, TX New Orleans, LA 
  Ramey, PR 
  Spokane, WA 
  Swanton, VT 
 
IX.2 B 
Chart 1 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (2, 12, 22, 32, & 42) 
Potential Illegal Immigrant Population Over Time
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Chart 2 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (2, 12, 22, 32, & 42) 
Actual Illegal Immigration Population Over Time
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Chart 3 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (2, 12, 22, 32, & 42) 
Illegal Immigrant Apprehension Population Over Time
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Chart 4 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (2, 12, 22, 32, & 42) 
Border Crossing Rate Over Time
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Chart 5 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (2, 12, 22, 32, & 42)
Apprehension Rate Over Time
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Chart 6 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (2, 12, 22, 32, & 42)
Deportation Rate Over Time
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Chart 7 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (3, 13, 23, 33, & 43)
Potential Illegal Immigrant Population Over Time
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Chart 8 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (3, 13, 23, 33, & 43)
Actual Illegal Immigration Population Over Time
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Chart 9 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (3, 13, 23, 33, & 43)
Illegal Immigrant Apprehension Population Over Time
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Chart 10 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (3, 13, 23, 33, & 43)
Border Crossing Rate Over Time
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Chart 11 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (3, 13, 23, 33, & 43)
Apprehension Rate Over Time
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Chart 12 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (3, 13, 23, 33, & 43)
Deportation Rate Over Time
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Chart 13 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (4, 14, 24, 34, 44)
Potential Illegal Immigration Population Over Time
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Chart 14 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (4, 14, 24, 34, 44)
Actual Illegal Immigration Population Over Time
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Chart 15 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (4, 14, 24, 34, 44)
Illegal Immigrant Apprehension Population Over Time
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Chart 16 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (4, 14, 24, 34, 44)
Border Crossing Rate Over Time
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Chart 17 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (4, 14, 24, 34, 44)
Apprehension Rate Over Time
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Chart 18 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (4, 14, 24, 34, 44)
Deportation Rate Over Time
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Chart 19 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (5, 15, 25, 35, 45)
Potential Illegal Immigrant Population Over Time
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Chart 20 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (5, 15, 25, 35, 45)
Actual Illegal Immigration Population Over Time
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Chart 21 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (5, 15, 25, 35, 45)
Illegal Immigration Apprehension Population Over Time
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Chart 22 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (5, 15, 25, 35, 45)
Border Crossing Rate Over Time
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Chart 23 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (5, 15, 25, 35, 45)
Apprehension Rate Over Time
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Chart 24 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (5, 15, 25, 35, 45)
Deportation Rate Over Time
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Chart 25 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (6, 16, 26, 36, 46)
Potential Illegal Immigrant Population Over Time
0
10,000,000
20,000,000
30,000,000
40,000,000
50,000,000
60,000,000
20
09
.
00
20
09
.
50
20
10
.
00
20
10
.
50
20
11
.
00
20
11
.
50
20
12
.
00
20
12
.
50
20
13
.
00
20
13
.
50
20
14
.
00
20
14
.
50
20
15
.
00
20
15
.
50
20
16
.
00
20
16
.
50
20
17
.
00
20
17
.
50
20
18
.
00
20
18
.
50
20
19
.
00
20
19
.
50
20
20
.
00
20
20
.
50
20
21
.
00
Year
Po
pu
la
tio
n
PIIP for iicr = 1
PIIP for iicr = 2
PIIP for iicr = 3
PIIP for iicr = 4
PIIP for iicr = 5
 
 
 
Ohene-Asah 113
Chart 26 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (6, 16, 26, 36, 46)
Actual Illegal Immigrant Population Over Time
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Chart 27 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (6, 16, 26, 36, 46)
Illegal Immigrant Apprehension Population Over Time
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Chart 28 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (6, 16, 26, 36, 46)
Border Crossing Rate Over Time
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Chart 29 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (6, 16, 26, 36, 46)
Apprehension Rate Over Time
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Chart 30 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (6, 16, 26, 36, 46)
Deportation Rate Over Time
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Chart 31 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (7, 17, 27, 37, 47)
Potential Illegal Immigration Population Over Time
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Chart 32 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (7, 17, 27, 37, 47)
Actual Illegal Immigration Population Over Time
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Chart 33 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (7, 17, 27, 37, 47)
Illegal Immigrant Apprehension Population Over Time
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Chart 34 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (7, 17, 27, 37, 47)
Border Crossing Rate Over Time
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Chart 35 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (7, 17, 27, 37, 47)
Apprehension Rate Over Time
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Chart 36 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (7, 17, 27, 37, 47)
Deportation Rate Over Time
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Chart 37 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (8, 18, 28, 38, 48) 
Potential Illegal Immigrant Population Over Time
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Chart 38 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (8, 18, 28, 38, 48)
Actual Illegal Immigration Population Over Time
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Chart 39 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (8, 18, 28, 38, 48)
Illegal Immigrant Apprehension Population Over Time
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Chart 40 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (8, 18, 28, 38, 48)
Border Crossing Rate Over Time
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Chart 41 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (8, 18, 28, 38, 48)
Apprehension Rate Over Time
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Chart 42 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (8, 18, 28, 38, 48)
Deportation Rate Over Time
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Chart 43 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (9, 19, 29, 39, 49)
Potential Illegal Immigration Population Over Time
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Chart 44 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (9, 19, 29, 39, 49)
Actual Illegal Immigrant Population Over Time
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Chart 45 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (9, 19, 29, 39, 49)
Illegal Immigrant Population Over Time
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Chart 46 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (9, 19, 29, 39, 49)
Border Crossing Rate Over Time
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Chart 47 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (9, 19, 29, 39, 49)
Apprehension Rate Over Time
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Chart 48 
Detention and Deportation: Simulation #'s (9, 19, 29, 39, 49)
Deportation Rate Over Time
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IX.3 C 
Chart 1 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (2, 12, 22, 32, & 42) 
Potential Illegal Immigrant Population Over Time
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Chart 2 
Detention and Deportation with Amnesty: Simulation #'s (2, 12, 22, 32, & 42)  
Actual Illegal Immigrant Population Over Time
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Chart 3 
Detention and Deportation with Amnesty: Simulation #'s (2, 12, 22, 32, & 42)
Amnesty Population Over Time  
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Chart 4 
Detention and Deportation with Amnesty: Simulation #'s (2, 12, 22, 32, & 42)
Illegal Immigrant Apprehension Population Over Time  
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Chart 5 
Detention and Deportation with Amnesty: Simulation #'s (2, 12, 22, 32, & 42)
Border Crossing Rate Over Time  
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Chart 6 
Detention and Deportation with Amnesty: Simulation #'s (2, 12, 22, 32, & 42) 
Apprehension Rate Over Time  
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Chart 7 
Detention and Deportation with Amnesty: Simulation #'s (2, 12, 22, 32, & 42)  
Amnesty Rate Over Time  
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Chart 8 
Detention and Deportation with Amnesty: Simulation #'s (2, 12, 22, 32, & 42)   
Deportation Rate Over Time  
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Chart 9 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (3, 13, 23, 33, & 43) 
Potential Illegal Immigrant Population Over Time
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Chart 10 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (3, 13, 23, 33, & 43)  
Actual Illegal Immigrant Population Over Time
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Chart 11 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (3, 13, 23, 33, & 43)  
Amnesty Population Over Time
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Chart 12 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (3, 13, 23, 33, & 43)   
Illegal Immigrant Apprehension Population Over Time
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Chart 13 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (3, 13, 23, 33, & 43)
Border Crossing Rate Over Time
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Chart 14 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (3, 13, 23, 33, & 43)
Apprehension Rate Over Time
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Chart 15 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (3, 13, 23, 33, & 43)
Amnesty Rate Over Time
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Chart 16 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (3, 13, 23, 33, & 43)
Deportation Rate Over Time
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Chart 17 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (4, 14, 24, 34, & 44) 
Potential Illegal Immigrant Population Over Time
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Chart 18 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (4, 14, 24, 34, & 44)  
Actual Illegal Immigrant Population Over Time
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Chart 19 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (4, 14, 24, 34, & 44) 
Amnesty Population Over Time
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Chart 20 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (4, 14, 24, 34, & 44)  
Illegal Immigrant Apprehension Population Over Time
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Chart 21 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (4, 14, 24, 34, & 44)   
 Border Crossing Rate Over Time
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Chart 22 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (4, 14, 24, 34, & 44)   
 Apprehension Rate Over Time
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Chart 23 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (4, 14, 24, 34, & 44)    
 Amnesty Rate Over Time
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Chart 24 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (4, 14, 24, 34, & 44)     
 Deportation Rate Over Time
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Chart 25 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (5, 15, 25, 35, & 45) 
Potential Illegal Immigrant Population Over Time
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Chart 26 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (5, 15, 25, 35, & 45)  
Actual Illegal Immigrant Population Over Time
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Chart 27 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (5, 15, 25, 35, & 45)     
Amnesty Population Over Time
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Chart 28 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (5, 15, 25, 35, & 45)   
 Illegal Immigrant Apprehension Population Over Time
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Chart 29 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (5, 15, 25, 35, & 45)     
Border Crossing Rate Over Time
0
5,000,000
10,000,000
15,000,000
20,000,000
25,000,000
30,000,000
35,000,000
40,000,000
45,000,000
20
09
.
00
20
09
.
75
20
10
.
50
20
11
.
25
20
12
.
00
20
12
.
75
20
13
.
50
20
14
.
25
20
15
.
00
20
15
.
75
20
16
.
50
20
17
.
25
20
18
.
00
20
18
.
75
20
19
.
50
20
20
.
25
20
21
.
00
Year
Po
pu
la
tio
n
Border Crossing Rate for iicr = 1
Border Crossing Rate for iicr = 2
Border Crossing Rate for iicr = 3
Border Crossing Rate for iicr = 4
Border Crossing Rate for iicr = 5
 
 
 
Ohene-Asah 139
Chart 30 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (5, 15, 25, 35, & 45)     
Apprehension Rate Over Time
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Chart 31 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (5, 15, 25, 35, & 45)      
Amnesty Rate Over Time
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Chart 32 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (5, 15, 25, 35, & 45)      
 Deportation Rate Over Time
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Chart 33 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (6, 16, 26, 36, & 46)
Potential Illegal Immigrant Population Over Time
0
10,000,000
20,000,000
30,000,000
40,000,000
50,000,000
60,000,000
20
09
.
00
20
09
.
50
20
10
.
00
20
10
.
50
20
11
.
00
20
11
.
50
20
12
.
00
20
12
.
50
20
13
.
00
20
13
.
50
20
14
.
00
20
14
.
50
20
15
.
00
20
15
.
50
20
16
.
00
20
16
.
50
20
17
.
00
20
17
.
50
20
18
.
00
20
18
.
50
20
19
.
00
20
19
.
50
20
20
.
00
20
20
.
50
20
21
.
00
Year
Po
pu
la
tio
n
PIIP for iicr = 1
PIIP for iicr = 2
PIIP for iicr = 3
PIIP for iicr = 4
PIIP for iicr = 5
 
 
Ohene-Asah 141
Chart 34 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (6, 16, 26, 36, & 46) 
Actual Illegal Immigrant Population Over Time
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Chart 35 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (6, 16, 26, 36, & 46)   
Amnesty Population Over Time
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Chart 36 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (6, 16, 26, 36, & 46)  
 Illegal Immigrant Apprehension Population Over Time
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Chart 37 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (6, 16, 26, 36, & 46)    
Border Crossing Rate Over Time
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Chart 38 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (6, 16, 26, 36, & 46)    
 Apprehension Rate Over Time
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Chart 39 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (6, 16, 26, 36, & 46)      
Amnesty Rate Over Time
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Chart 40 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (6, 16, 26, 36, & 46)      
Deportation Rate Over Time
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Chart 41 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (7, 17, 27, 37, & 47)       
Potential Illegal Immigrant Population Over Time
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Chart 42 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (7, 17, 27, 37, & 47)       
Actual Illegal Immigrant Population Over Time
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Chart 43 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (7, 17, 27, 37, & 47)     
Amnesty Population Over Time
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Chart 44 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (7, 17, 27, 37, & 47)       
  Illegal Immigrant Apprehension Population Over Time
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Chart 45 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (7, 17, 27, 37, & 47)      
Border Crossing Rate Over Time
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Chart 46 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (7, 17, 27, 37, & 47)      
Apprehension Rate Over Time
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Chart 47 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (7, 17, 27, 37, & 47)       
Amnesty Rate Over Time
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Chart 48 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (7, 17, 27, 37, & 47)       
Deportation Rate Over Time
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Chart 49 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (8, 18, 28, 38, & 48)        
Potential Illegal Immigrant Population Over Time
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Chart 50 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (8, 18, 28, 38, & 48)         
Actual Illegal Immigrant Population Over Time
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Chart 51 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (8, 18, 28, 38, & 48)        
Amnesty Population Over Time
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Chart 52 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (8, 18, 28, 38, & 48)          
 Illegal Immigrant Apprehension Population Over Time
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Chart 53 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (8, 18, 28, 38, & 48)       
Border Crossing Rate Over Time
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Chart 54 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (8, 18, 28, 38, & 48)      
Apprehension Rate Over Time
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Chart 55 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (8, 18, 28, 38, & 48)      
 Amnesty Rate Over Time
0
5,000,000
10,000,000
15,000,000
20,000,000
25,000,000
30,000,000
35,000,000
40,000,000
45,000,000
20
09
.
00
20
09
.
50
20
10
.
00
20
10
.
50
20
11
.
00
20
11
.
50
20
12
.
00
20
12
.
50
20
13
.
00
20
13
.
50
20
14
.
00
20
14
.
50
20
15
.
00
20
15
.
50
20
16
.
00
20
16
.
50
20
17
.
00
20
17
.
50
20
18
.
00
20
18
.
50
20
19
.
00
20
19
.
50
20
20
.
00
20
20
.
50
20
21
.
00
Year
Po
pu
la
tio
n
Amnesty Rate for iicr = 1
Amnesty Rate for iicr = 2
Amnesty Rate for iicr = 3
Amnesty Rate for iicr = 4
Amnesty Rate for iicr = 5
 
 
 
Ohene-Asah 152
Chart 56 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (8, 18, 28, 38, & 48)      
 Deportation Rate Over Time
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Chart 57 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (9, 19, 29, 39, & 49)        
Potential Illegal Immigrant Population Over Time
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Chart 58 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (9, 19, 29, 39, & 49)        
 Actual Illegal Immigrant Population Over Time
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Chart 59 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (9, 19, 29, 39, & 49)           
Amnesty Population Over Time
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Chart 60 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (9, 19, 29, 39, & 49)         
  Illegal Immigrant Apprehension Population Over Time
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Chart 61 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (9, 19, 29, 39, & 49)         
Border Crossing Rate Over Time
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Chart 62 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (9, 19, 29, 39, & 49)     
  Apprehension Rate Over Time
0
5,000,000
10,000,000
15,000,000
20,000,000
25,000,000
30,000,000
35,000,000
40,000,000
45,000,000
50,000,000
20
09
.
00
20
09
.
50
20
10
.
00
20
10
.
50
20
11
.
00
20
11
.
50
20
12
.
00
20
12
.
50
20
13
.
00
20
13
.
50
20
14
.
00
20
14
.
50
20
15
.
00
20
15
.
50
20
16
.
00
20
16
.
50
20
17
.
00
20
17
.
50
20
18
.
00
20
18
.
50
20
19
.
00
20
19
.
50
20
20
.
00
20
20
.
50
20
21
.
00
Year
Po
pu
la
tio
n
Apprehension Rate for iicr = 1
Apprehension Rate for iicr = 2
Apprehension Rate for iicr = 3
Apprehension Rate for iicr = 4
Apprehension Rate for iicr = 5
 
Chart 63 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (9, 19, 29, 39, & 49)      
 Amnesty Rate Over Time
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Chart 64 
Detention and Deportation With Amnesty: Simulation #'s (9, 19, 29, 39, & 49)     
   Deportation Rate Over Time
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